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CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE AS INTERPRETATION
AND AS REMEDY
Eric S. Fish*
In a number of recent landmark decisions, the Supreme Court has used the
canon of constitutional avoidance to essentially rewrite laws. Formally, the
avoidance canon is understood as a method for resolving interpretive ambiguities: if there are two equally plausible readings of a statute, and one of them
raises constitutional concerns, judges are instructed to choose the other one.
Yet in challenges to the Affordable Care Act, the Voting Rights Act, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and other major statutes, the Supreme Court has
used this canon to adopt interpretations that are not plausible. Jurists, scholars, and legal commentators have criticized these decisions, claiming that they
amount to unaccountable judicial lawmaking. These criticisms highlight a basic contradiction in contemporary avoidance doctrine. On the one hand, the
avoidance canon is described as an interpretive rule of thumb that guides
courts in discerning congressional intent. Yet on the other, the Supreme Court
commonly uses the avoidance canon to create statutory meanings that conflict
with Congress’s intent, and does so in the name of new constitutional rules
that Congress did not foresee. This is not “interpretation” in the conventional
sense; it is rewriting in the service of constitutional norm enforcement.
This Article mounts a new defense of such rewriting-as-interpretation. It does
so by reframing the avoidance canon as two different judicial tools: (1) a canon of interpretation, and (2) a constitutional remedy. The latter of these—
avoidance as a constitutional remedy—makes sense of courts’ power to effectively rewrite statutes. A court that finds a statute unconstitutional can creatively reinterpret that statute in a way that changes its meaning in order to
fix the constitutional violation, just as it can invalidate statutory language,
strike down applications, and impose other kinds of remedies that change the
statute’s meaning. This idea is not as unusual as it may seem. Many other
countries currently treat avoidance as a constitutional remedy. In the United
Kingdom and New Zealand, for example, judges cannot invalidate laws, and
so creative reinterpretation of statutes is the only judicial mechanism for remedying violations of constitutional rights. And in Canada, constitutional avoidance doctrine has been divided into an interpretive canon and a remedy,
exactly as this Article advocates. Further, the Supreme Court of the United
States has effectively treated avoidance as a remedy in two major recent decisions—United States v. Booker and National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius—though it did not acknowledge that it was doing so.
Bifurcating avoidance into a canon and a remedy resolves the contradiction
between avoidance as an interpretive tool and avoidance as a means of changing the law. It does so by separating out these two functions. The interpretive
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avoidance canon can be used to resolve true ambiguities through the presumption that Congress does not intend to pass statutes that conflict with preexisting constitutional rules. The reinterpretation remedy, in turn, can be used to
change a statute’s meaning after it has been held unconstitutional, and to do
so even where the court is announcing a new constitutional rule.
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Introduction
In 2014, the Supreme Court decided that poisoning your neighbor does
not violate the Chemical Weapons Convention.1 A woman named Carol
Anne Bond was prosecuted for putting arsenic on her neighbor’s mail, after
discovering that the neighbor was having an affair with Bond’s husband.2
The implementing legislation for the Chemical Weapons Convention forbids
any person knowingly “to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, transfer directly or indirectly, receive, stockpile, retain, own, possess, or use, or
threaten to use, any chemical weapon.”3 By the plain terms of this statute,
Bond was guilty. However, the Court did not apply its plain terms. Invoking
the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, Chief Justice John Roberts’s majority opinion “interpreted” an exception into the statute providing that it did
not apply to individual acts of poisoning.4 This let the Court dodge the
thorny question of whether the federal government can criminalize such acts
through a treaty.
1. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
2. Dahlia Lithwick, The Case of the Poisoned Lover, Slate (Feb. 22, 2011, 6:34 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/supreme_court_dispatches/2011/02/the_
case_of_the_poisoned_lover.html [http://perma.cc/8336-SVB8].
3. Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 § 201, 18 U.S.C.
§ 229(a)(1) (2012).
4. See Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2087.
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This reasoning should sound familiar. The year before Bond, Chief Justice Roberts pulled the same move in one of the most consequential judicial
opinions in American history. That case, National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius, decided the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act.5
The question in Sebelius was the validity of a provision requiring individuals
to either purchase health insurance or pay a fine.6 Chief Justice Roberts cast
the deciding vote, and concluded that the Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to command the purchase of health insurance.7 However,
he also found that Congress does have the power to tax individuals for failing
to purchase health insurance.8 Thus the constitutionality of the individual
mandate turned on whether it was properly understood as a “command” or
a “tax.”9 Chief Justice Roberts concluded that, while the provision was written as a command, it must be interpreted as a tax in order to make it constitutional: “[I]t is only because we have a duty to construe a statute to save it,
if fairly possible, that [the mandate] can be interpreted as a tax.”10 He thus
saved the mandate by changing its meaning through interpretation.
Chief Justice Roberts has adopted implausible interpretations to avoid
constitutional questions in a number of other cases as well. In Northwest
Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), Roberts (joined by seven other justices) interpreted the term “political subdivision” in the Voting Rights Act to include tiny utility districts.11 He thereby
allowed such districts to escape the Voting Rights Act’s “preclearance” regime, which requires covered jurisdictions to obtain permission before making any changes to voting procedures.12 This was not a natural reading of the
statute. The Voting Rights Act (VRA) explicitly defines the term “political
subdivision” to mean “any county or parish,”13 a definition that clearly excludes utility districts.14 In Skilling v. United States, the Court similarly used
5. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
6. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2580.
7. See id. at 2592–93 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). The four joint dissenters also concluded
that the individual mandate was not a valid exercise of the Commerce Clause power, see id. at
2644–50 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting), but no majority opinion was
written on this point.
8. Id. at 2594 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
9. See id. at 2584 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
10. Id. at 2600–01 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
11. 557 U.S. 193, 210–11 (2009).
12. See NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 202, 210–11.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(c)(2) (2012); see NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 206.
14. Indeed, the majority’s interpretation was so implausible that commentators viewed
NAMUDNO as signaling a strong likelihood that the VRA’s preclearance regime would soon
be struck down unless Congress addressed the Court’s constitutional concerns. See, e.g.,
Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Minimalism, the Mandate, and Mr. Roberts, in The Health Care
Case 171, 172–74 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2013); Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court, 2009 Sup. Ct. Rev. 181, 220–21; Richard M. Re,
The Doctrine of One Last Chance, 17 Green Bag 2d 173, 175 (2014); Travis Crum, Note, The
Voting Rights Act’s Secret Weapon: Pocket Trigger Litigation and Dynamic Preclearance, 119 Yale
L.J. 1992, 1996 (2010); Heather Gerken, Online VRA Symposium: Reading the Tea Leaves—The
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the avoidance canon to narrow the federal mail and wire fraud statutes.15
One provision of those statutes defines “a scheme or artifice[ ]to defraud” as
including “a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of
honest services.”16 This language is arguably so vague that defendants lack
adequate notice about what conduct is criminalized. In order to avoid that
constitutional vagueness problem, the Court in Skilling “interpreted” the
statute to cover only bribes and kickback schemes.17
In each of these recent landmark decisions, the Roberts Court essentially
“interpreted” new words into a major statute in order to avoid holding the
statute unconstitutional. Members of the Court have criticized these uses of
the avoidance canon, arguing that they go beyond the boundaries of permissible interpretation.18 The late Justice Antonin Scalia called such uses of
avoidance “gruesome surgery” and “result-driven antitextualism.”19 Justice
Thomas has noted that “[a] disturbing number of this Court’s cases have
applied the canon of constitutional doubt to statutes that were on their face
clear.”20 Prominent legal commentators have also been critical, calling Chief
Justice Roberts’s opinions “implausible”21 and “exceedingly odd,”22 and accusing him of “marching to a beat of his own.”23 Academics have piled on as
well, with Richard Hasen suggesting that the Roberts Court is using the
avoidance canon selectively to achieve conservative political results,24 and
Uncertain Future of the Act, SCOTUSblog, (Sept. 11, 2012, 1:40 PM), http://www.scotusblog.
com/2012/09/online-vra-symposium-reading-the-tea-leaves-the-uncertain-future-of-the-act/
[http://perma.cc/4T7X-Y6ZK]. This prediction was ultimately validated. See Shelby Cty., Ala.
v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
15. 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2925–35 (2010).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012).
17. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2931.
18. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2676 (2012) (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“The Court today decides to save a statute Congress
did not write. It rules that what the statute declares to be a requirement with a penalty is
instead an option subject to a tax. . . . The Court regards its strained statutory interpretation as
judicial modesty. It is not. It amounts instead to a vast judicial overreaching.”); Skilling, 130 S.
Ct. at 2940 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“I do not believe
we have the power, in order to uphold an enactment, to rewrite it.”).
19. Bond v. United States 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2095, 2097 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
20. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 400 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
21. Linda Greenhouse, Op-Ed, Down the Memory Hole, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 2009, at A31.
22. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Roberts Was Wrong to Apply the Canon of Constitutional
Avoidance to the Mandate, SCOTUSreport (July 11, 2012, 8:36 AM), https://web.archive.org/
web/20131005230520/http://www.scotusreport.com/2012/07/11/roberts-was-wrong-to-applythe-canon-of-constitutional-avoidance-to-the-mandate/ [https://perma.cc/5L5W-7LZH].
23. Damon Root, John Roberts’ Constitutional Avoidance, Reason (June 4, 2014), http://
reason.com/archives/2014/06/04/john-roberts-constitutional-avoidance [http://perma.cc/
8DBV-HP7E].
24. See Hasen, supra note 14.
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Neal Katyal and Thomas Schmidt proposing limits to the canon that would
curb its supposed excesses.25
This Article takes a different view. It defends Chief Justice Roberts’s signature move, and it does so by redefining that move as a constitutional remedy rather than a canon of interpretation. As these cases illustrate, there is a
basic contradiction in the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. On the one
hand, it is officially framed as an interpretive technique—a court presumes
that the legislature does not intend to act unconstitutionally, and so it construes ambiguous statutes to avoid constitutional problems. Yet on the other,
it is commonly used as a tool of constitutional enforcement, by which a
court changes a statute’s meaning to protect a constitutional norm. But
avoidance cannot be both of these things at once. It cannot help judges determine the legislature’s intent, while at the same time letting judges subvert
that intent in the service of constitutional norms. To resolve this contradiction, the doctrine should be reframed as two distinct judicial tools: an interpretive canon and a constitutional remedy. The interpretive canon will
function as a true aid to interpretation—it will help judges construe ambiguous statutes by assuming that Congress does not intend to violate preexisting constitutional rules. The remedy, by contrast, will allow judges to
actually change a statute’s meaning by creatively reinterpreting it to render it
constitutionally valid, as the Roberts Court did in Sebelius, NAMUDNO,
Bond, and Skilling. This type of remedy—herein labeled “remedial reinterpretation”—can only be employed after a statute is actually held unconstitutional. It is thus a less intrusive cousin of other constitutional remedies, like
striking down unconstitutional applications or invalidating statutory text.
Bifurcating constitutional avoidance in this way fixes a number of enduring problems with the doctrine. First, it solves the mystery of how judges
can presume that Congress does not intend to violate a constitutional rule
that the Supreme Court had not yet announced at the time the law was
passed.26 The answer is that judges cannot make this presumption, because
Congress could not have been aware of the rule. However judges can use
remedial reinterpretation to change a law if it violates a newly announced
constitutional rule. Second, bifurcation solves the dicta problem. Under the
classic doctrine of avoidance, judges only avoided interpretations that would
actually make the statute unconstitutional.27 But this forced them to make
constitutional holdings in dicta, because in the end they were merely construing the statute, not striking it down. Remedial reinterpretation solves
this problem by forcing a judge to make a constitutional holding first, and
only then letting them change the statute’s meaning. Third, and more
broadly, bifurcation also limits the countermajoritarian problem associated
with aggressive uses of avoidance. It does so by restricting judges’ ability to
reinterpret statutes to only those situations where the statute has already
25. See Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern Supreme
Court and Legal Change, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 2109 (2015).
26. See id. at 2122–26.
27. See infra notes 34–39 and accompanying text.
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been held unconstitutional. In such situations, judges’ power to change statutory language is at its peak—they can already strike down language, strike
down applications, and even sometimes add language to fix a constitutional
violation.28 By contrast, it is far less legitimate for a judge to change a statute’s meaning without having held it unconstitutional, and so the interpretive avoidance canon should be limited to situations where the statute is
truly ambiguous.
This Article is divided into three Parts. Part I discusses the doctrinal and
academic debate over the meaning of the avoidance canon. First, it shows
that the Supreme Court’s current avoidance doctrine is marked by two different conflicts. One conflict is between the so-called classic and modern
avoidance canons. Under the classic canon a court only avoids interpretations that actually violate the Constitution, while under the modern canon a
court also avoids interpretations that merely raise constitutional “doubts.”
The modern canon has been the dominant approach for the last several
decades, but Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in Sebelius brought the
classic canon back with a vengeance.29 The second conflict is over how far
the statute’s meaning can be stretched. In one understanding of the canon,
prominently defended by Justice Scalia, it is merely an interpretive
tiebreaker—if there are two equally plausible readings of the statute, the
avoidance canon selects the winner.30 But in another, broader version, the
canon can be used to select the less plausible interpretation if doing so
avoids constitutional difficulties. Part I then surveys the scholarly debate
over avoidance, showing how the canon’s justifications have evolved from a
Bickelian minimalist account focused on avoiding judicial review to a more
activist account focused on enforcing constitutional norms.
Part II makes the case that remedial reinterpretation should be added to
avoidance doctrine. It does so by explaining the logic of remedial reinterpretation, and arguing that it fits within the existing system of American constitutional review. Remedial reinterpretation involves a different kind of
interpretation than that traditionally taught in legislation textbooks. Rather
than discerning the statute’s meaning from conventional sources like the
plain text or the legislative purpose, courts use creative reasoning to actually
change the statute’s meaning. Part II defends the legitimacy of remedial reinterpretation by arguing that the power to use it follows a fortiori from federal courts’ existing powers to impose constitutional remedies, for example
by striking down statutory language, adding statutory language, and creating
as-applied statutory exceptions. Part II then shows that remedial reinterpretation is widely used by judges in a number of foreign legal systems. In the
28. See Eric S. Fish, Choosing Constitutional Remedies, 63 UCLA L. Rev. 322, 348–51
(2016) (describing equal protection cases in which the Supreme Court has remedied an underinclusive statute by effectively adding text).
29. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600–01 (2012) (opinion of
Roberts, C.J.) (“[I]t is only because we have a duty to construe a statute to save it, if fairly
possible, that [the individual mandate] can be interpreted as a tax.”).
30. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 336 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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United Kingdom and New Zealand, judges lack the power to strike down
statutes, and so remedial reinterpretation is the only mechanism of constitutional rights enforcement. And in Canada judges have bifurcated constitutional avoidance in precisely the way this Article advocates—it is both a
constitutional remedy and a canon of interpretation. Part II closes by arguing that the Supreme Court of the United States has already effectively
adopted a remedial reinterpretation framework through its decisions in
Sebelius and United States v. Booker.31 In Sebelius, the Court explicitly chose
the less plausible interpretation of the statute in order to fix a constitutional
violation, thus doing away with the fiction that it was resolving an ambiguity
rather than changing the law.32 In Booker, the Court treated an avoidance
reading as one of several possible constitutional remedies. It ultimately rejected that avoidance reading, choosing instead to invalidate multiple provisions of the statute.33
Part III discusses how bifurcating the avoidance canon would work in
practice. It first examines the various ways that bifurcation would benefit
constitutional avoidance doctrine—by solving a number of enduring doctrinal puzzles, limiting the scope of the judge-made constitutional penumbra,
and making judicial uses of avoidance more transparent. It next considers
how remedial reinterpretation should be weighed against other constitutional remedies, showing the greater flexibility that treating avoidance as a
remedy brings. It then explores the extent to which judges can actually
change a statute’s meaning through remedial reinterpretation, describing
several possible limits to interpretive rewriting. Finally, it closes by showing
why judges might be tempted to blur the line between avoidance as a remedy
and avoidance as an interpretive canon.
I. The Dimensions of Constitutional Avoidance
There is not one single version of the avoidance canon. Rather, the doctrine of avoidance varies along two dimensions. First, it varies based on what
kinds of interpretations a judge is able to avoid—those that are actually
found unconstitutional or those that merely raise constitutional “doubts.”
Second, it varies based on how far the statutory meaning can be stretched in
the name of avoidance—whether the canon is merely a tiebreaker, or actually allows judges to choose the less plausible meaning to avoid constitutional problems. This Part explores these different conceptions of the
avoidance canon. It then examines the deeper justifications for these doctrinal choices by reviewing the scholarly debate over how and why judges use
constitutional avoidance.

31. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566; United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
32. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2600–01 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
33. Booker, 543 U.S. at 258–65.
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Dimension One: Violations or Mere Doubts

The avoidance canon has a long history, stretching back to the early days
of the American republic.34 In its original formulation—so-called classic
avoidance—the canon provides that “as between two possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and by the
other valid, our plain duty is to adopt that which will save the Act.”35 This
means that the reviewing court must first decide that one possible interpretation would make the statute unconstitutional, and only then can it choose
a different interpretation to avoid this problem.36 In contrast, a second formulation of the avoidance canon—so-called modern avoidance—only requires that the court have “constitutional doubts” about the disfavored
reading.37 That is, the court need not find that the avoided reading is actually unconstitutional, the court must only find that there is a good chance of
it being unconstitutional. The canonical statement of this approach is found
in Justice Brandeis’s concurring opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Authority: “When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question,
and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal
principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the
statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”38 Thus a
court must, before deciding the constitutional question, seek out an interpretation of the statute by which it might be avoided. This modern canon
34. Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 109, 139
(2010) (“The unconstitutionality canon has the longer pedigree . . . the canon seems to have
emerged in 1814 and matured by the late nineteenth century.”); William W. Berry III, Criminal Constitutional Avoidance, 104 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 105, 110 (2014); see also Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12, 14 (1800) (“[T]he 11th section of the judiciary act can,
and must, receive a construction, consistent with the constitution.”).
35. Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring).
36. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 395 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Traditionally, the avoidance canon . . . . commanded courts, when faced with two plausible constructions of a statute—one constitutional and the other unconstitutional—to choose the
constitutional reading.”); Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive
Branch, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1189, 1203 (2006) (“Under classical avoidance, the court must
‘reach the issue whether the doubtful version of the statute is constitutional [and conclude that
it is not] before adopting the construction that saves the statute from constitutional invalidity.’ ]” (alteration in original) (quoting Clark, 543 U.S. at 395 (Thomas, J., dissenting)));
Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 Geo. L.J. 1945, 1949 (1997) (“The basic difference
between classical and modern avoidance is that the former requires the court to determine that
one plausible interpretation of the statute would be unconstitutional, while the latter requires
only a determination that one plausible reading might be unconstitutional.”).
37. See United States v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909) (“[W]here a statute
is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the
latter.”); John Copeland Nagle, Delaware & Hudson Revisited, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1495,
1497 (1997) (“[C]ourts since Delaware & Hudson have employed the more prudential doubts
canon.”).
38. 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285
U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
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has become the dominant approach, supplanting the classic canon in most
contemporary cases.39
The principal justification for the shift to modern avoidance was that it
prevents a court from issuing advisory opinions.40 Justice Edward White articulated this rationale in United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., noting
that “the rule plainly must mean that where a statute is susceptible of two
constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions
arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to
adopt the latter” because otherwise the rule would mean “that our duty is to
first decide that a statute is unconstitutional and then proceed to hold that
such ruling was unnecessary”41—in other words, to give an advisory opinion. Justice Brandeis similarly prefaced his discussion of modern avoidance
in Ashwander by noting that “federal courts . . . have no power to give advisory opinions.”42 The reasoning here is that since the avoidance canon is
simply a guide to interpretation—helping judges discern what the statute
already means, not empowering them to change the statute’s meaning—any
finding that the avoided interpretation is unconstitutional would be unnecessary to decide the case. If a statute is susceptible to interpretations X or Y,
and X would be unconstitutional, the court must then choose Y. But once it
chooses Y, then nothing further turns on whether interpretation X in fact
makes the statute unconstitutional. So any holding on that question is an
advisory opinion. All the court can do, then, is state in dicta that grave
constitutional doubts exist. Hence the modern avoidance canon truly lets
courts avoid deciding the constitutional issue, while the classic canon requires ruling on it. And, by logical extension, the modern canon allows
courts to use avoidance even when the avoided reading would not in fact
render the statute unconstitutional. This has permitted the Court to announce new constitutional rules without having to actually strike down statutes.43 For example, in Bond the Court effectively changed the meaning of
the Chemical Weapons Convention based on a constitutional theory that the
Court has not in fact adopted—the theory that there are subject-matter limitations on the power to make treaties.44 Similarly, in NAMUDNO the Court
39. See Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Serious Constitutional Doubts: The Supreme Court’s
Construction of Statutes Raising Free Speech Concerns, 30 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1, 92 (1996)
(referring to the “more common ‘serious doubts’ formulation”); Nagle, supra note 37, at
1497–98; Vermeule, supra note 36, at 1949 n.24 (arguing that “the twentieth-century case law
overwhelmingly supports” the dominance of the modern canon).
40. See Morrison, supra note 36, at 1206–07; William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional
Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 831, 840 (2001) (“Because this
placed the Court in the apparent position of rendering advisory opinions on constitutional
questions, it shifted to the doctrine of the modern avoidance canon in Delaware & Hudson.”).
41. 213 U.S. at 408.
42. Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 345–46 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
43. See Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 25, at 2114 (“[T]he mix of modern constitutional
litigation, where sophisticated litigants frame up arguments with constitutional-ish points,
coupled with the avoidance doctrine, has given us a dangerous cocktail. The avoidance canon
provides an opening for new doctrines, and the sophisticated litigants provide a source.”).
44. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2087–88 (2014).
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changed the meaning of the Voting Rights Act based on the then-hypothetical constitutional principle of “equal sovereignty” among the states.45 In
cases such as these, there is no way to know whether the Court is actually
avoiding a finding of unconstitutionality, or is instead using illusory
“doubts” to change the meaning of a perfectly valid statute.
Modern avoidance is currently the prevailing approach in the Supreme
Court,46 with one quite notable exception: Chief Justice Roberts’s majority
opinion in Sebelius. In that case, Chief Justice Roberts made a doctrinal innovation: he held that the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate was
properly interpreted as a command, but that it would be unconstitutional if
so interpreted, and so it must instead be read as a tax.47 Chief Justice Roberts
thus sought a way to make a constitutional holding without running into the
Delaware & Hudson advisory opinion problem. He sequenced the avoidance
inquiry into three steps: (1) find the correct interpretation of the statute; (2)
determine whether that interpretation is unconstitutional; (3) if the correct
interpretation is unconstitutional, and another (“fairly possible” but incorrect) interpretation is constitutional, adopt the alternative interpretation.48
This approach could be termed neoclassical avoidance. It involves finding
the avoided interpretation unconstitutional, while sequencing the inquiry
into discrete steps to get around the advisory-opinion problem.49 The difficulty with this approach, however, is that since Chief Justice Roberts purports to be deciding what the statute already means (rather than changing
what it means) his rejection of the unconstitutional interpretation is still
45. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009) (quoting
United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 16 (1960)); see also Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 25, at
2133–36 (noting that this principle has since gained doctrinal traction, despite starting out as
dicta).
46. See sources cited supra note 39.
47. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600–01 (2012) (opinion of
Roberts, C.J.).
48. Id.
49. In a 2006 article, Trevor Morrison foresaw neoclassical avoidance in a prescient footnote. See Morrison, supra note 36, at 1205 n.58. Morrison drew an analogy to qualified immunity cases in which (under then-prevailing law) a court must first determine whether an officer
violated a constitutional right and could only then go on to decide whether that right was
clearly established. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). However, contrary to Morrison’s argument, a court does not actually make a constitutional holding if it finds that there
was qualified immunity. This is because nothing turns on such a constitutional holding—the
officer was not liable even if their action was unconstitutional. A finding that an officer violated a constitutional right may be a particularly powerful kind of dicta, but is not a constitutional holding unless the officer is also found liable. See Wilkinson ex rel. Wilkinson v. Russell,
182 F.3d 89, 112 (2d Cir. 1999) (Calabresi, J., concurring); Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the
Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1249, 1275 (2006) (criticizing Saucier as “a
puzzling misadventure in constitutional dictum”); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
234–35 (2009) (overturning the Saucier requirement, due in part to criticism that it required
courts to declare new constitutional doctrine in dicta). But see Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct.
2020, 2030 (2011) (stating in dicta that an officer prevailing in a qualified immunity case can
nonetheless appeal a finding that they violated a constitutional right).
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dicta.50 As Justice Ginsburg points out in her partial concurrence, there is
“no reason to undertake a Commerce Clause analysis that is not outcome
determinative.”51 Nothing turns on whether or not the individual mandate is
constitutionally valid under the Commerce Clause. If the Commerce Clause
empowers Congress to enact commands, then the mandate is upheld as a
command. If the Commerce Clause does not give Congress the power to
enact commands, the mandate is upheld as a tax. Either way the mandate is
upheld. There cannot be a constitutional holding on the breadth of the
Commerce Clause unless the statute is actually found unconstitutional.52
B. Dimension Two: Tiebreaking or Rewriting
The second dimension along which avoidance doctrine varies is the degree to which judges engage in interpretive stretching. Under one understanding of the canon, it is merely a tiebreaker—what I call “tiebreaking
avoidance.” If there are two interpretations that are both plausible, then constitutional avoidance can be used to choose one over the other.53 Under a
different understanding of the canon, judges are actually permitted to select
a less-accurate interpretation. That is, they can effectively change the meaning of the statute to something other than what Congress intended if doing
so will avoid a constitutional problem—what I dub “rewriting avoidance.”54
The difference between tiebreaking avoidance and rewriting avoidance lies in
their adherents’ assumptions about the range of “plausible” interpretations.
For tiebreaking avoidance, there must be a legitimate ambiguity. That is, the
judicial interpreter must first determine that the statute could legitimately
mean either X or Y, and can only then use the avoidance canon to decide
between X and Y. The canon thus serves the same function as the baseball
rule that a tie goes to the runner—it provides a default rule for unclear
situations.55 By contrast, rewriting avoidance applies in situations where the
most accurate reading of the statute is X, while Y is within a range of “plausible” but inaccurate interpretations. Thus, for tiebreaking avoidance the
range of potential interpretations includes only those that Congress may
have intended, while for rewriting avoidance that range also includes at least
some interpretations that Congress did not intend. The Supreme Court uses
50. “A dictum is an assertion in a court’s opinion of a proposition of law which does not
explain why the court’s judgment goes in favor of the winner.” Leval, supra note 49, at 1256.
51. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2629 n.12 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
52. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. The thesis of this Article solves that problem by recasting Roberts’s avoidance interpretation as a remedy. See infra Section II.B.
53. See, e.g., Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 59–60 (1997).
54. See, e.g., Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2600–01 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
55. It is worth noting that the tie does not actually go to the runner in American Major
League Baseball. Rather, the rule seems to be that there are no ties—the umpire must decide
whether the baseball or the runner got to the base first. See Major League Baseball, Official Baseball Rules, R. 5.06(a)(1), 5.09(a)(10), (b)(6) (2015 ed.).
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both of these types of avoidance, though it has not yet formally distinguished them or acknowledged that they follow different logics.
Justice Scalia was the Supreme Court’s most vociferous defender of
tiebreaking avoidance. In Scalia’s judicial opinions, he advanced the view
that the avoidance canon is a rule of thumb for discerning legislative intent.
It is “a tool for choosing between competing plausible interpretations of a
statutory text, resting on the reasonable presumption that Congress did not
intend the alternative which raises serious constitutional doubts,” and “thus
a means of giving effect to congressional intent, not of subverting it.”56 This
view makes the avoidance canon a cousin of the absurd results canon, the
presumption against retroactivity, and other interpretive canons meant to
guide judges in discerning the probable legislative intent.57 In articulating
the avoidance canon’s rationale this way, Justice Scalia made an empirical
assumption about Congress—that its members in fact care whether their
enactments are constitutionally suspect and generally intend those enactments to bear a meaning that does not approach the constitutional line.
Interestingly, however, Justice Scalia rejected that very assumption as “a dubious rationale” in his scholarly writing, and he advanced a second justification for tiebreaking avoidance: that it avoids conflict between the judiciary
and the legislature.58 This makes the avoidance canon more like the rule of
lenity—it breaks interpretive ties by choosing the interpretation that advances certain system values.59 Regardless of the justification for tiebreaking
avoidance, the key point is that it can only be used to resolve true ambiguities. Justice Scalia often defended tiebreaking avoidance in dissent in cases
where he believed the majority stretched the statutory meaning beyond the

56. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381–82 (2005); see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289,
336 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The doctrine of constitutional doubt is meant to effectuate,
not to subvert, congressional intent, by giving ambiguous provisions a meaning that will avoid
constitutional peril, and that will conform with Congress’s presumed intent not to enact measures of dubious validity.”); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 314 n.9 (1993) (Scalia, J.) (noting
that avoidance is “the last refuge of many an interpretive lost cause”).
57. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of
Legal Texts 234–39, 261–65 (2012).
58. Id. at 248 (“In the texts that it enacts, a legislature should not be presumed to be
sailing close to the wind, so to speak . . . . That was perhaps the original reason for the
rule . . . . But with respect to federal legislation at least—where the canon is routinely applied—that is today a dubious rationale. The modern Congress sails close to the wind all the
time. Federal statutes today often all but acknowledge their questionable constitutionality.”);
see also Kelley, supra note 40, at 898.
59. See Scalia & Garner, supra note 57, at 296–302; see also United States v. Wiltberger,
18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820) (Marshall, C.J.) (“The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly . . . . is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; and on
the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial
department.”).
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range of plausible choices.60 A number of other Supreme Court justices, past
and present, have done the same.61
By contrast, it is difficult to find a Supreme Court decision that explicitly defends rewriting avoidance. The Court has often used avoidance to
adopt implausible interpretations, and it has done so since well before the
Roberts Court.62 But the Court rarely announces that it is rewriting a statute
under the guise of interpretation. It does, however, sometimes formulate the
canon in a way that suggests it is fudging—for example, stating that
“[a]lthough this Court will often strain to construe legislation so as to save it
against constitutional attack, it must not and will not carry this to the point
of perverting the purpose of a statute . . . or judicially rewriting it,”63 or that
it need only find an interpretation that is “fairly possible.”64 Statements such
60. See, e.g., St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 336 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting); United States v. XCitement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 80–81 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting); cf. Bond v. United
States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2095, 2097 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (defending
the use of avoidance as a tiebreaker, but noting that the majority stretched the statutory meaning beyond the range of plausible choices); Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2940
(2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (writing separately to
note that avoidance is unnecessary because the statutory language is not susceptible to two
interpretations).
61. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2676 (2012) (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting); Nw. Austin. Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder,
557 U.S. 193, 212 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 511, 516–18 (1979) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 345 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in the
result); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 785–86 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting);
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 144–45 (1961) (Black, J.,
dissenting); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 213–14 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting);
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 131–32, 143 (1958) (Clark, J., dissenting); United States v. UAW,
352 U.S. 567, 596–98 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
62. See, e.g., Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490; United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs,
402 U.S. 363 (1971); Welsh, 398 U.S. 333; Kent, 357 U.S. 116; Watkins v. United States, 354
U.S. 178 (1957); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); United States v. Witkovich, 353
U.S. 194 (1957); see also Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Beyond the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 759, 836 (1997) (“[Catholic Bishop]
was controversial at the time it was decided and remains controversial today because the otherwise proper interpretation of the Labor Act that the Avoidance Canon defeated was not open
to reasonable disagreement, as a matter of ordinary English . . . .” (footnotes omitted)); Philip
P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal Process Theory,
and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 Calif. L. Rev. 397,
420–25, 446 (2005) (“The judicial behavior at work in the early Warren Court’s cases avoided
deciding some constitutional questions only by aggressive rewriting of statutes.”); Kloppenberg, supra note 39, at 24–39 (showing that the Court used the avoidance canon to rewrite
statutes in X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64 (1994), and Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491
(1985)). State courts also frequently use avoidance to rewrite statutes. See Stewart G. Pollock,
The Art of Judging, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 591, 600–01 (1996) (providing numerous examples of
state court decisions that used the avoidance doctrine to change a statute’s meaning).
63. Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 741–42 (1984) (quoting Aptheker v. Sec’y of State,
378 U.S. 500, 515 (1964)).
64. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2929–30 (2010) (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 331
(1988)).
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as these might be taken as tacit admissions that an avoidance interpretation
may not accurately reflect Congress’s intent. Yet when the Court adopts an
interpretation that Congress clearly did not intend, it generally acts as
though it is not changing the statutory meaning, but instead choosing between plausible alternatives.65 There is, however, one notable recent exception: Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius explicitly adopted rewriting avoidance. In that case, Chief
Justice Roberts took the unique step of actually announcing that he would
adopt the less plausible interpretation in order to avoid striking down the
Affordable Care Act. He wrote that “the statute reads more naturally as a
command to buy insurance than as a tax, and I would uphold it as a command if the Constitution allowed it,” and further that “it is only because we
have a duty to construe a statute to save it, if fairly possible, that [the mandate] can be interpreted as a tax.”66 Sebelius is thus once again a fascinating
outlier. The Court has often changed a statute’s meaning through the avoidance canon, but it has rarely been transparent about doing so. Where prior
uses of rewriting avoidance went unannounced, the decision to rewrite the
Affordable Care Act through interpretation was explicit.
C. The Scholarly Debate over the Avoidance Canon
There is a robust scholarly debate over whether judges using the avoidance canon are respecting the legislative branch, or are instead usurping
Congress’s lawmaking power. The classic defense of the canon is that it limits judicial encroachment on the legislature by preventing judges from holding laws unconstitutional. However, a number of academics have criticized
the canon as actually giving judges more power to change laws, effectively
rewriting them based on constitutional doctrines that may or may not actually be valid. This argument has in turn provoked countercritiques by defenders of the canon, who justify it on the more outcome-oriented ground
that it allows judges to enforce constitutional norms. The academic justifications for avoidance have thus evolved from the classic Bickelian account of
judicial minimalism to more modern theories that recognize and defend the
canon’s law-changing function.
The classical argument for the avoidance canon is that it is more democratic to send legislation back to Congress than to strike it down. The most
influential articulation of this view comes from Alexander Bickel’s The Least
Dangerous Branch.67 Bickel was deeply concerned with constitutional review’s anti-democratic features. He argued that, in order to minimize interference with majoritarian lawmaking, judges should exercise great restraint

65. See, e.g., Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2090; Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2931 n.43; NAMUDNO, 557
U.S. at 206–07; X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 68–69; Welsh, 398 U.S. at 342–43.
66. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2600–01(opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
67. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at
the Bar of Politics (2d ed. 1986).
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when deciding constitutional law cases. Judges should thus, for example, dismiss constitutional cases on procedural grounds, decline to exercise jurisdiction where possible, and, if they must make a constitutional holding, do so
on the narrowest possible grounds.68 The avoidance canon is another such
strategy of judicial restraint. On Bickel’s account, it allows a court to send
the statute back to Congress for a “second look,” so that Congress can confirm whether it actually meant to approach the constitutional line before the
court goes on to decide the statute’s validity.69 Avoidance thus gives the
court an excuse to save the statute by not deciding the constitutional question, and gives Congress a chance to reconsider what it wants the statute to
mean. Modern Bickelians have echoed this restraint-based case for avoidance. Cass Sunstein, for example, argues that the avoidance canon requires
that Congress be explicit when it encroaches on constitutional rights.70 The
canon is thus, on Sunstein’s reasoning, a modern successor to the nondelegation doctrine—it ensures that Congress will take political responsibility
for statutes that approach the constitutional line, rather than delegating that
decision to judicial or agency interpreters. Similarly, Judge Guido Calabresi
understands constitutional avoidance as a mechanism of interbranch dialogue.71 He warns that when Congress infringes on constitutional rights
through unclear language it may be acting with thoughtless haste, or, perhaps, trying to hide its actions from public scrutiny.72 The avoidance canon
allows courts to send such questionable statutes back to Congress for more
thorough consideration, without forcing courts to define the precise limits
of Congress’s power. In sum, the avoidance canon’s Bickelian defenders view
it as a safeguard of democratic deliberation. It lets judges refrain from invalidating statutes, while ensuring that Congress will more fully and explicitly
consider whether it wants to potentially violate the Constitution.
A number of scholars have criticized this view of avoidance, arguing that
the canon does not preserve democracy, but rather undermines it by empowering judges to make essentially legislative decisions.73 These scholars
68. Id. at 111–98.
69. See id. at 164–69, 180–83 (using Watkins to show how the Court will sometimes send
a statute back to Congress before deciding hotly contested constitutional issues, such as determining the grounds sufficient to support denial of a passport); see also Alexander M. Bickel &
Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 34–35 (1957) (“A candid avowal that a matter the implications of which
Congress failed to see is being sent back for a second reading, so to speak, is much more
compatible with due respect for the peculiar powers and competences of both institutions.”).
70. See Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court 27, 219–21 (1999); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 405, 459, 468–69 (1989).
71. See Guido Calabresi, Foreword: Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accountability
(What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 Harv. L. Rev. 80, 103–05, 120 (1991).
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, Benchmarks 199–201 (1967); Jerry L. Mashaw,
Greed, Chaos, and Governance: Using Public Choice to Improve Public Law 105
(1997); Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 25, at 2112; Kelley, supra note 40, at 834; Kloppenberg,

1290

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 114:1275

point out that judges who invoke the avoidance canon often change the statute’s meaning to something Congress clearly did not intend. Thus the canon
is less a clear-statement rule and more a means of overriding congressional
choices. And worse, under the modern version of the canon, judges use it
merely to evade constitutional “doubts.” Judges are thus effectively rewriting
statutes to avoid constitutional problems that may or may not be real,74 and
thereby enforcing what Richard Posner calls a “judge-made constitutional
‘penumbra.’ ”75 These problems are compounded by a troubling lack of
transparency. As Henry Friendly has noted, “it is one of those rules that
courts apply when they want and conveniently forget when they
don’t . . . .”76 For instance, some point to the fact that the Roberts Court did
not use the avoidance canon in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,77 but did use it in Sebelius and other cases,78 as evidence that the Court
employs the canon opportunistically, calling a statute “ambiguous” or
“clear” for outcome-driven reasons rather than interpretive ones.79
The canon may also disinhibit judges from making new constitutional
law. Neal Katyal and Thomas Schmidt argue that because judges are not
forced to actually strike down a law in the case at bar, they are more willing
to go out on a limb in their constitutional theorizing and announce new
supra note 39, at 23–24; John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 Sup. Ct. Rev. 223, 253–60; Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the
Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 827, 840 (1991); Hiroshi Motomura,
Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 Yale L.J. 545, 561–75 (1990); Nagle, supra note 37, at 1496; Richard A.
Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev.
800, 816 (1983); Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 71, 74; Harry H.
Wellington, Machinists v. Street: Statutory Interpretation and the Avoidance of Constitutional
Issues, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 49.
74. See Kelley, supra note 40, at 862–63; Motomura, supra note 73 (pointing out “phantom constitutional norms” in the immigration context); Vermeule, supra note 36, at 1960–61
(citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); NLRB v. Catholic
Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961)
as examples of cases where the Court avoided readings that it later determined were constitutionally valid).
75. Posner, supra note 73 at 816; see also United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1318
(7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.) (warning that the overuse of the avoidance canon enlarges the
constitutional penumbra and construes laws out of existence).
76. Friendly, supra note 73, at 211.
77. 558 U.S. 310, 374–76 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (explaining why the majority
did not answer the question on pure statutory-interpretation grounds by adopting an avoidance interpretation to avoid all constitutional issues).
78. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600–01 (2012) (opinion
of Roberts, C.J.) (upholding the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate as a tax to avoid
finding it unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause); see also supra notes 5–23 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 14; Tonja Jacobi, Obamacare as a Window on Judicial
Strategy, 80 Tenn. L. Rev. 763, 787–90 (2013); cf. Kloppenberg, supra note 39, at 40 (“An
attempt to reconcile the broad application of the canon in X-Citement Video with its narrow
application in Rust highlights how application of the avoidance canon may be driven by
politics.”).
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constitutional doctrines.80 This is especially problematic because the ostensible premise of avoidance—that Congress does not intend to violate the Constitution—cannot logically apply where judges create the relevant doctrine
after the law is enacted. And the high degree of legislative inertia in the
American political system undermines the Bickelian assertion that avoidance
is simply a matter of giving the legislature a “second look.” Avoidance interpretations are likely to last quite a long time, given how rarely Congress
overrides the Supreme Court’s statutory decisions.81 These criticisms of
avoidance have been quite influential, to the point that the canon is now
widely perceived as a tool of activist lawmaking rather than judicial
minimalism. As Richard Hasen notes, “there seems to be consensus that the
canon’s use signals a Court that is actively engaged in shaping law and policy, not acting modestly.”82
In the last few decades, some constitutional scholars have articulated a
new rationale for the avoidance canon: that it allows judges to resist
majoritarian encroachment on fundamental values by using clear statement
rules to hinder legislative rights restrictions.83 In contrast to the Bickelians,
these scholars recognize that the canon empowers rather than restrains
judges. However they argue that such empowerment is a good thing in our
system, since it lets judges preserve underenforced constitutional values
without having to strike down any statutes.84 Ernest Young labels the avoidance canon a “resistance norm,” because it raises obstacles to congressional

80. See Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 25, at 2112–14.
81. See Posner, supra note 73, at 816 (“Congress’s practical ability to overrule a judicial
decision misconstruing one of its statutes, given all the other matters pressing for its attention,
is less today than ever before, and probably was never very great. The practical effect of interpreting statutes to avoid raising constitutional questions is therefore . . . to create a judge-made
constitutional ‘penumbra’ that has much the same prohibitory effect as the judge-made (or at
least judge-amplified) Constitution itself.”); see also Mashaw, supra note 73, at 102–03; Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court
Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 1317 (2014) (showing that congressional overrides of Supreme Court statutory decisions have, in the last few decades, become quite rare); Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 25, at 2118–19.
82. Hasen, supra note 14, at 189.
83. See, e.g., Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1575 (2001);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1007
(1989); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement
Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593 (1992); Frickey, supra note 62; Morrison, supra note 36, at 1212–16; Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 Yale L.J. 2
(2008); Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of
Judicial Review, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1549 (2000).
84. See generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212 (1978) (pointing out that federal courts often
underenforce constitutional rights due to various institutional limitations, and arguing that
this justifies going beyond judicial enforcement through other mechanisms).
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actions approaching the constitutional line, but it does not forbid such actions entirely.85 This gives judges a nimbleness they lack when striking statutes down. They can create a constitutional penumbra without recognizing
any actual constitutional violations, and they can enforce this penumbra
without formally restricting Congress’s power to make laws. For example,
Philip Frickey has shown that the Warren Court frequently invoked the
avoidance canon in the 1950s to protect the rights of accused dissidents and
subversives.86 In using the canon thusly, the Court protected vulnerable constitutional values while limiting its interventions by “construing” the relevant statutes rather than striking them down. These scholars’ defense of the
avoidance canon does away with the fiction that it is a rule of thumb for
determining the legislature’s intent. On their account judges are not “interpreting” statutes, at least not in the conventional sense, but are instead
throwing up obstacles to make it more difficult to enact constitutionally
problematic laws. These scholars thus see avoidance not as a principle of
interpretation, but rather as a tool of constitutional enforcement akin to
remedies like invalidation.87
II. Creative Interpretations as Remedies
There is a basic contradiction in how we understand the avoidance canon. On the one hand, it is doctrinally framed as just one of many interpretive resources—along with text, purpose, and legislative history—that judges
can draw upon to discern what the enacting legislature intended a statute to
mean. But on the other hand, it is generally recognized that avoidance interpretations are sometimes outcome-oriented tools of constitutional lawmaking, through which judges change a statute’s meaning in light of
constitutional norms.88 Even Justice Scalia admitted that the avoidance canon “represents judicial policy—a judgment that statutes ought not to tread
on questionable constitutional grounds unless they do so clearly . . . .”89 But
the avoidance canon cannot serve both of these roles at once. It cannot be a
means of interpreting the statute and at the same time a means of changing
the statute to advance certain system goals.
To resolve that contradiction, constitutional avoidance should be understood as two different doctrinal tools: first, a canon of interpretation, and
second, a constitutional remedy. Under this reframing, the interpretive canon would function as a rule of thumb to discern legislative intent—it
would help judges determine the meaning of ambiguous statutes by letting
them assume that Congress does not intend to violate the Constitution.
Meanwhile, the remedy would empower judges to fix actual constitutional
85. Young, supra note 83 at 1585.
86. Frickey, supra note 62.
87. Cf. Calabresi, supra note 71, at 103–08 (categorizing the “second look” approach as a
species of judicial review).
88. See supra notes 73–86 and accompanying text.
89. Scalia & Garner, supra note 57, at 249.
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violations by adopting meanings that conflict with Congress’s intentions.
Thus the canon would fuse tiebreaking and modern avoidance, while the
remedy would fuse rewriting and classical avoidance.
This Part unpacks and justifies this new concept of remedial reinterpretation. It first distinguishes between two different ways of interpreting a statute: the conventional methods taught in legislation textbooks (discerning the
authors’ intent by looking to text, context, purpose, and legislative history),
and a more creative model of interpretation that empowers readers to explore new meanings that might be ascribed to the text. It then argues that
American judges have the power to use this creative model of interpretation
as a remedy when a statute is held unconstitutional. It does so by comparing
remedial reinterpretation to other constitutional remedies, showing that remedial reinterpretation is widely used by judges in a number of foreign legal
systems, including New Zealand’s, the United Kingdom’s, and Canada’s, and
arguing that the Supreme Court of the United States has basically already
adopted remedial reinterpretation in two major cases—National Federation
of Independent Business v. Sebelius and United States v. Booker.90
A. Two Kinds of Interpretation
In the American legal system, the conventional framework of statutory
interpretation is presented as a debate.91 Lined up on one side are the textualists, led by Judge Easterbrook and late Justice Scalia, who look only to the
words of a statute and care nothing for its legislative history.92 Lined up
opposite are the purposivists, led by Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, who interpret statutes in light of their motivating goals, and who consider legislative history and other sources of evidence external to the text.93 In the
middle are more pragmatic theorists like William Eskridge and Phil Frickey,
who combine these methods in syncretic fashion.94 These various camps
each emphasize different types of evidence in the search for a statute’s
meaning, but they all share a commitment to discerning what the statute
already means. That is, they all view judges as passive interpreters trying to
90. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220 (2005).
91. See William N. Eskridge Jr. et al., Cases and Materials on Legislation and
Regulation 568–641 (5th ed. 2014).
92. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation (Amy Gutmann ed.,
1997); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 Harv.
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 59 (1988); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev.
621 (1990); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175 (1989).
93. See Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution (2005); Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems
in the Making and Application of Law 1374 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
eds., 1994); Peter L. Strauss, The Courts and the Congress: Should Judges Disdain Political History?, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 242 (1998).
94. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 321 (1990).
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find the most accurate reading of the statute. The statutory meaning is a
buried treasure, and these theories are maps to the big red X.
A different, more creative model of interpretation would allow the
reader of a text to take on an authorship role. While textualism and purposivism give the reader maps to a certain location, a creative model of interpretation empowers them to blaze their own trail. The reader takes a text and
considers what new meanings its words might bear. They do not limit themselves to the words’ conventional meanings or the apparent intentions of the
authors, but instead the reader views the task of interpretation as generative
and result oriented. The great poet and literary theorist Oscar Wilde articulated just such a view of interpretation in his dialogue “The Critic as Artist.”95 Wilde wrote:
To the critic the work of art is simply a suggestion for a new work of his
own, that need not necessarily bear any obvious resemblance to the thing it
criticizes. The one characteristic of a beautiful form is that one can put into
it whatever one wishes, and see in it whatever one chooses to see; and the
Beauty, that gives to creation its universal and aesthetic element, makes the
critic a creator in his turn, and whispers of a thousand different things
which were not present in the mind of him who carved the statue or
painted the panel or graved the gem.96

Of course, it would be profoundly undemocratic if judges always acted
like Wilde’s critic when interpreting statutes. Judges could then reinterpret
the law to reach whatever result they thought desirable in the case at bar.
They would effectively replace legislatures. The words of the statute would
be simply a jumping off point in any particular case, or perhaps a polite
suggestion from the elected branches. This is why passive models of interpretation—textualism, purposivism, and the like—dominate American jurisprudence. Creative interpretation does not fit our intuitions about the
limits of the judicial role. But there are a few circumstances where creative
interpretation by judges is legitimate in our constitutional system.97 The
constitutional avoidance canon is traditionally applied in one such circumstance: where a statute, when interpreted according to the conventional approach, leads to a violation of the Constitution.98 The Constitution trumps
statutes in our system, and so judges have the power to change statutes to
make them consistent with the Constitution. Creative interpretation is one
possible tool for creating such consistency. If the words of a statute mean X,
but X is unconstitutional, then judges can creatively reinterpret the statute to
95. Oscar Wilde, The Critic as Artist 70–71 (Green Integer Books 1997) (1888). I
owe this reference to my inestimable colleague Kevin Lamb.
96. Id.
97. William Eskridge has argued that one such circumstance arises where a statute has
become anachronistic. That is, Eskridge claims that judges should (and in fact do) construe
old statutes contrary to the original legislative expectations where those expectations no longer
fit the social context. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1479, 1504–05 (1987).
98. See Morrison, supra note 36, at 1202–03.
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instead mean Y.99 This is a much less problematic type of creative interpretation than would be a general power to change statutes’ meanings through
interpretation, because it is limited to contexts where a statute has been
found unconstitutional. And in such contexts, the judicial power to change
statutes is already at its peak.
When a judge engages in remedial reinterpretation, they creatively reinterpret the relevant statute to make it consistent with the Constitution. Such
reinterpretations have a particular logic: they are oriented toward system
coherence. The judge looks for a construction of the text that will make it
consistent with the larger system of law in which it is embedded, even if this
is not the most accurate account of the particular text’s meaning when read
in isolation, and even if it conflicts with the intentions of the particular text’s
authors. In the legal context, this means choosing an interpretation of a
statute that makes it consistent with the constitutional system.
Other examples of coherence-oriented reinterpretations can be found in
fan theories about film franchises. These are theories that conflict with evidence from specific films, but make sense of the films when viewed together.
Consider the James Bond franchise. Agent Bond has faced off against an
impressive array of geographically and temporally diverse villains. He has
foiled plots hatched by a global terrorist organization, a Central American
drug lord, a North Korean dictator, a mad tycoon obsessed with gold, and
many other scoundrels.100 It would be quite difficult for a single person to
defeat all of these villains, not least because the films span more than five
decades. Thus, according to one fan theory, “James Bond” is not a single
individual, but a code name for many different British agents.101 There is no
evidence to support this theory in any particular film—at no point does
James Bond reveal that there have been other James Bonds, and indeed this
theory conflicts with some evidence from the films.102 But it makes sense of
the larger collection of movies by explaining how “James Bond” could have
accomplished all of these feats. There is a similar fan theory about the Star
Wars films. The droids C-3PO and R2-D2 are both characters in the original
Star Wars trilogy, in which they help Luke Skywalker defeat Darth Vader and

99. Cf. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804) (establishing
the rule that American laws must not be construed to conflict with international law if any
other construction is possible); Rebecca Crootof, Note, Judicious Influence: Non-Self-Executing
Treaties and the Charming Betsy Canon, 120 Yale L.J. 1784 (2011). One might imagine a
stronger version of the Charming Betsy canon whereby it could be used to actually change
statutes’ meaning in order to make domestic law consistent with international law.
100. See, e.g., Die Another Day (Eon Productions 2002); From Russia with Love (Eon
Productions 1963); Goldfinger (Eon Productions 1964); License to Kill (Eon Productions
1989).
101. James Bond is a Codename, Wikia, http://fantheories.wikia.com/wiki/James_Bond
[http://perma.cc/WW9M-5K8Q].
102. Id. (noting evidence against this theory, such as that James Bond goes rogue in License to Kill but is still called “James Bond,” and that James Bond makes reference to the death
of his wife in several different films).
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bring peace to the galaxy. They are also present in the three Star Wars prequel films, where they are friends with the boy who later becomes Darth
Vader. Yet in the original films, when they are trying to defeat Darth Vader,
they never make reference to this prior friendship. The films officially deal
with this problem through a scene where the droids’ memory is erased at the
end of the prequels.103 But one theory holds that R2-D2 kept its memory
and helped orchestrate the events of the original Star Wars films based on its
prior knowledge of Darth Vader.104 This theory conflicts with some evidence
from the films. But it makes the films fit together much more logically than
does the alternative theory that it is just a massive coincidence that the same
droids befriended both Darth Vader and Luke. The purpose of these theories
is not to discern what the creators of the movies actually had in mind when
they wrote the scripts. Rather, it is to reinterpret the scripts in a way that
makes them fit together in a more logical fashion.
A similar thing happens when judges creatively interpret a statute to
make it consistent with the Constitution. The judges are not trying to figure
out what the statute’s authors actually intended to do, or discern the conventional meaning of the statute’s text. Rather, they are trying to find a
meaning for the statute that will fix a contradiction between the statute and
larger system in which it is embedded.
B. Sebelius, Booker, and De Facto Remedial Reinterpretation
The concept of remedial reinterpretation also helps explain two recent
landmark Supreme Court decisions: National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius and United States v. Booker.105 The Court did not articulate
the concept of remedial reinterpretation in either of these cases, nor did it
acknowledge a difference between avoidance as a remedy and avoidance as
an interpretive canon. However, the reasoning in both of these decisions
only makes sense if one understands the majority to be treating constitutional avoidance as a remedy. This suggests that the Supreme Court already
uses remedial reinterpretation, though it has not officially recognized that it
does so.
In Sebelius, Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion contained both of
the elements of remedial reinterpretation: it combined rewriting avoidance
and classic avoidance. Chief Justice Roberts explicitly stated that he was interpreting the challenged provision against its clear meaning—it was written
as a mandate to buy health insurance, but he was reinterpreting it so that it
was instead a tax for not buying health insurance. He wrote that “the statute
reads more naturally as a command to buy insurance than as a tax, and I
would uphold it as a command if the Constitution allowed it,” and further
103. Star Wars: The Complete Saga (20th Century Fox 2011) (1977–2005).
104. Chewbacca and R2D2: Secret Rebel Agents, Wikia, http://fantheories.wikia.com/wiki/
Star_Wars [http://perma.cc/TLY2-W4LD].
105. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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that “it is only because we have a duty to construe a statute to save it, if fairly
possible, that [the mandate] can be interpreted as a tax.”106 Chief Justice
Roberts also claimed to be making a precedential holding that the mandate
would not have been constitutionally valid under the Commerce Clause. He
wrote that “[i]t is only because the Commerce Clause does not authorize
such a command that it is necessary to reach the taxing power question,”
and further that “[w]ithout deciding the Commerce Clause question, I
would find no basis to adopt such a saving construction.”107 Although Roberts tried to get around the advisory opinion problem by sequencing the
avoidance inquiry into several stages, and claiming that he could only adopt
a saving construction after “holding” the most natural reading unconstitutional, the result was merely dicta.108 As Justice Ginsburg pointed out in her
partial concurrence, Chief Justice Roberts’s Commerce Clause holding is not
outcome determinative, and so it cannot be a holding.109 If the Chief Justice
is using the avoidance canon simply as an interpretive principle, then the
result in the case does not turn on whether the power to regulate commerce
lets Congress mandate the purchase of health insurance. If the mandate is
within the commerce power then it is upheld, and if the mandate is not
within the commerce power then it is interpreted as a tax and also upheld.
The Commerce Clause analysis is thus dicta.110 However, treating avoidance
as a remedy solves this problem. If avoidance is a constitutional remedy, then
the majority must first decide that a mandate would be unconstitutional
before going on to reinterpret the mandate as a tax. This is because a constitutional remedy can only be imposed after an actual finding of unconstitutionality. Thus, if one reads Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in
Sebelius as an exercise in remedial reinterpretation, then his neoclassical
avoidance move works. The Commerce Clause analysis becomes necessary to
the decision and is thereby made a constitutional holding rather than merely
dicta.
In United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court effectively treated an
avoidance interpretation as a remedy. The Court held in Booker that the
system of federal sentencing guidelines established by the Sentencing Reform
Act was unconstitutional.111 The guidelines made certain judge-found facts
result in a mandatory increase in a defendant’s sentence without requiring
that those facts be proven to a jury.112 This violated the Sixth Amendment
106. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2600–01(opinion of Roberts, C.J.); see supra notes 47–50 and
accompanying text.
107. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2600–01 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
108. I label this approach “neoclassical” avoidance, because it tries to return to the
pre–Delaware & Hudson classic canon in which a court must first make a constitutional holding before it can adopt an avoidance interpretation. See supra notes 34–36, 41–43, and accompanying text.
109. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2629 n.12 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
110. See Leval, supra note 49, at 1256; supra note 49 and accompanying text.
111. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 232, 243 (2005).
112. See id. at 227.
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right to a jury trial.113 If judicial fact-finding leads to an automatic increase
in sentence length, then the jury’s role is circumvented. After this constitutional violation was established, however, the justices disagreed on the question of remedy. Justice Breyer wanted to strike down certain provisions of
the Sentencing Reform Act so as to make the guidelines advisory.114 This
would mean that the guidelines’ enhancement factors would no longer cause
mandatory increases in sentences, and thus that judicial fact-finding at sentencing would no longer automatically lead to greater punishment. Instead,
judges would determine the appropriate punishment according to their own
views, using the guidelines only as nonbinding advice. Justice Stevens proposed a different solution. He relied upon the fact that the Sentencing Reform Act does not actually refer to “the sentencing judge,” but instead only
to “the court.”115 He used this fact to argue that the constitutional violation
could be solved by an avoidance interpretation—the justices could interpret
the words “the court” in the law to mean “the judge and the jury,” and
thereby prevent circumvention of the jury’s fact-finding function.116 Under
Justice Stevens’s proposed interpretation, the jury would have to find any
facts that cause an increase in the guidelines sentence, thus solving the Sixth
Amendment problem.
Since Justice Stevens’s proposal was an avoidance argument, it should
(under the conventional understanding of avoidance as an interpretive principle) have been considered before Justice Breyer’s proposal to strike down
part of the statute. This is because if Justice Stevens’s interpretation was
correct, then there would be no constitutional violation in the first place, so
there would be nothing to remedy. If “court” in the statute means “judge
and jury,” then the Sixth Amendment is already satisfied. But this is not how
the justices framed the choice between avoidance and invalidation. Instead
they treated the proposals as alternative remedies. Each justice argued for his
respective solution by trying to show that it better fit with the enacting Congress’s goals in passing the Sentencing Reform Act, and that the alternative
solution would conflict with the choices Congress had made.117 They thus
considered these solutions to be dueling remedial options, even though Justice Stevens’s proposal was explicitly framed as an avoidance interpretation.118 Indeed, both Justice Breyer and Justice Stevens repeatedly referred to
Justice Stevens’s avoidance interpretation as a “remedy” throughout their
opinions in Booker, with Justice Breyer calling it “the dissenters’ proposed

113. Id. at 243–44.
114. Id. at 258–66 (Breyer, J.).
115. Id. at 286 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
116. Id. (“As a textual matter, the word ‘court’ can certainly be read to include a judge’s
selection of a sentence as supported by a jury verdict—this reading is plausible either as a pure
matter of statutory construction or under principles of constitutional avoidance.”).
117. Id. at 247–49 (Breyer, J.); id. at 292–99 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
118. Id. at 286 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
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remedy,” and Justice Stevens calling it “my proposed remedy.”119 The majority ultimately adopted Justice Breyer’s solution of making the guidelines advisory through partial invalidation and rejected Justice Stevens’s avoidance
interpretation. But the Court only rejected Justice Stevens’s proposal after it
had already found the mandatory sentencing guidelines unconstitutional in
a separate majority opinion (which was authored by Justice Stevens himself).120 The Supreme Court thus clearly treated Justice Stevens’s interpretation of the words “the court” as a remedy to be considered only after the
statute had already been held unconstitutional, and to be evaluated as an
alternative to invalidation. It did not treat Justice Stevens’s avoidance interpretation as an argument about what the Sentencing Reform Act already
meant ex ante. The Court, without explicitly saying so, validated the doctrine of remedial reinterpretation.
C. The Constitutionality of Remedial Reinterpretation
When a judge finds a statute unconstitutional, they are then empowered
to alter that statute in order to fix the constitutional violation. As a consequence, a judge deciding a constitutional review case gains the ability to
change the challenged statute in ways they normally could not. The judge
can impose one of several possible remedies. First, the judge can declare the
offending statute invalid and strike it down. In Marbury v. Madison the Supreme Court used this power to invalidate a section of the Judiciary Act of
1789,121 and since that decision the Court has struck down many other state
and federal statutes that violated the Constitution.122 Second, the judge can
strike down an application of the law while leaving the rest of the law intact.
This is called an “as-applied” invalidation—it creates an exception to the
statute, so that it no longer applies in a certain category of cases. For example, in Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England the Supreme
Court decided that a New Hampshire statute restricting minors’ access to
abortions was unconstitutional as-applied to situations where the minor
needs an abortion for health reasons.123 The Court thereby carved out an
atextual exception for medically necessary abortions, while leaving the law’s
actual provisions intact. Third, the judge can, in some cases, effectively add
119. See, e.g., id. at 249 (Breyer, J.) (“[W]e compare maintaining the Act as written with
jury factfinding added (the dissenters’ proposed remedy) to the total invalidation of the statute . . . .”); id. at 258 (Breyer, J.) (“Yet that is the system that the dissenters’ remedy would
create”); id. at 288 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (“Third, the majority argues that my remedy
would make sentencing proceedings far too complex.”); id. at 289 (Stevens, J., dissenting in
part) (“And, unlike my proposed remedy, which would potentially affect only a fraction of
plea bargains, the uncertainty resulting from the Court’s regime change will infect the entire
universe of guilty pleas which occur in 97% of all federal prosecutions.”).
120. Id. at 245–46 (Breyer, J.).
121. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
122. See 1 Otis H. Stephens, Jr. et al., American Constitutional Law 55 (6th ed.
2015).
123. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320 (2006).
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language to a statute by expanding its provisions to include previously excluded cases. The Supreme Court has imposed such “leveling up” remedies
to fix statutes that violate the Equal Protection Clause by unconstitutionally
excluding certain groups. For example, in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld the Court
considered a challenge to a social security statute that provided benefits to
widows with dependent children, but not to widowers.124 The Court found
that this constituted unconstitutional sex discrimination, so it expanded the
benefit to widowers. This meant that the Court had to effectively add new
text to the statute, since there was no way to include widowers by striking
down text.125 Courts have done the same in a number of other constitutional
equality cases.126 In short, courts in our system enjoy extensive powers to
change the content of statutes in order to fix constitutional violations. They
can strike down language, strike down applications, and even sometimes add
language to make a statute constitutional.
Compared to these remedies, the power to creatively reinterpret a statute seems rather unobtrusive. If a judge can strike down the entire statute,
strike down applications of the statute, and even expand the statute, then it
would seem to follow a fortiori that the judge can also give the statute’s text
a new interpretation that renders it constitutional. In doing so, a court does
not even have to add or invalidate language, it can just give the existing
language a different meaning. And if the judge already has the quasi-legislative power to change the statute’s language if it is found unconstitutional,
surely the judge can also reinterpret the existing language.
Indeed, all four of these remedial categories—striking down language,
striking down applications, expanding the statute, and reinterpreting the
statute—amount to the same thing in practice. Judges cannot actually
change the contents of the legislative code, and so when they strike down a
statute it remains on the books, just as when they expand a statute or eliminate an application the actual text in the legislative code remains the same.127
Thus with each of these types of remedy, all that the judge actually does is
change the effect of the law, creating a gap between the statute’s text and its
operational meaning. To strike down a certain provision is to declare that
that provision will be construed as having no meaning. To eliminate an application through an as-applied ruling is to declare that the statute will be
construed as not applying to a certain type of case that its text clearly
reaches. To expand a statute is to declare that the statute will be construed as
applying more broadly than its words provide. These different remedial categories are all useful shorthands for a judge to communicate how the statute
124. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
125. See Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 653; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Judicial
Authority to Repair Unconstitutional Legislation, 28 Clev. St. L. Rev. 301, 302–03 (1979).
126. See, e.g., Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 93 (1979); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973); People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 579 (N.Y. 1984).
127. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 700 (2012) (establishing criminal penalties for defacing the
American flag), invalidated by United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
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will be understood going forward. But they are not functionally diverse approaches to judicial review—they are simply different strategies for communicating the judge-made gap between the statute’s text and its meaning.128
Remedial reinterpretation does exactly the same thing: it gives the statute a
new, different meaning that conflicts with the text (as interpreted through
conventional methods), but that renders the statute constitutional. It is thus
no different from other constitutional remedies that are widely used in our
system.
D. Foreign Models of Interpretation as Remedy
This concept of remedial reinterpretation may seem a bit odd at first. It
combines two different judicial functions—statutory interpretation and judicial review—that are usually kept separate. But the concept becomes
rather less strange when one realizes that remedial reinterpretation is one of
the more common forms of judicial review around the world. As Alec Stone
Sweet has shown, remedial reinterpretation is widely used by European constitutional courts.129 These courts issue what Stone Sweet calls “binding interpretations” of statutes, which provide that a statute will be considered
constitutional if and only if it is interpreted as the constitutional court says.
Such binding interpretations “authoritatively rewrite the legislative provisions in question, thus amending them, in that they authoritatively state
exactly what the law means, and how it must be applied by judges, regardless
of how legislators intended it to be applied.”130 They are a common mechanism of constitutional enforcement in Europe, to such an extent that they
have at times comprised the majority of a constitutional court’s decisions.131
Some foreign legal systems go even further and establish remedial reinterpretation as the sole mechanism of judicial review. In New Zealand, for
example, there is no formal constitution, and judges lack the power to invalidate statutes.132 There is, however, a statute called the New Zealand Bill of
128. Fish, supra note 28 (manuscript at 44–45) (arguing that these different remedial categories all blend together).
129. See Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in
Europe 71–73 (2000).
130. Id. at 72.
131. See id. (“Constitutional courts have produced a rising tide of such declarations. In
France, for example, the percentage of decisions containing binding interpretations has risen
from 11 per cent (1959–74), to 14.5 per cent (1974–81), to 19.5 per cent (1981–5); in 1986, 56
per cent (9/16) of the decisions the Council rendered contained them. In Italy, the same percentage rose from 15 per cent during the 1980s, to 25 per cent since 1990. . . . [M]ore than 2/3
of the decisions rendered by the [Italian Constitutional Court] on legal texts promulgated
during the 1987–90 period announced binding interpretations.” (citations omitted)).
132. For an account of New Zealand’s constitutional structure, see N.Z. Parliamentary
Library, The New Zealand Constitution (Feb. 15, 2000), http://www.parliament.nz/re
source/en-nz/00PLLawRP00011/502fa2135dd16543ca15974a028ad70161b80aba [http://www.
http://perma.cc/4AAY-WRGS] (noting, among other observations, that “New Zealand does
not have a ‘written constitution’ which has the status of superior law, governing all other law
and requiring procedures . . . for amendment”).
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Rights Act that enumerates a number of civil and political rights for New
Zealanders.133 Section 6 of the Bill of Rights Act instructs judges to interpret
all other statutes in a manner that is consistent with these rights.134 Thus
under section 6, a court will first determine whether the most natural reading of the relevant statute conflicts with the Bill of Rights Act, and if it does,
the court will then adopt a new interpretation that resolves the conflict. This
can mean effectively rewriting the statute. For example, in Hopkinson v. Police the High Court of Wellington used section 6 to decide that a statute
prohibiting actions that “dishonour” the flag of New Zealand did not apply
to a man who burned a New Zealand flag in front of the parliament building
to protest the war in Iraq.135 The court first determined that the most natural meaning of the word “dishonour” applied to the man’s conduct.136 However, the court then held that if the statute were so interpreted it would
constitute an unjustified limit on freedom of expression, and would thus
conflict with the Bill of Rights Act.137 The court therefore used section 6 of
the Bill of Rights Act to reinterpret “dishonour” more narrowly, as meaning
“vilify.”138 That is, it added a requirement that the defendant must do more
than just burn a flag symbolically. The defendant must also express some
further disparagement of the flag (though the court did not precisely define
what “vilifying” the flag might consist of).139 This is a textbook case of remedial reinterpretation. The court (1) decided on the most natural interpretation of the statute, (2) determined that that interpretation violated the Bill
of Rights Act, and (3) remedied that violation by creatively reinterpreting
the statute to protect the endangered right. And such remedial reinterpretation is the only mechanism of judicial rights enforcement in New Zealand,
since judges cannot strike down laws.
The United Kingdom has a very similar system of reinterpretation-based
judicial review.140 In the United Kingdom, the relevant rights-creating statute is the Human Rights Act of 1998, which empowers British judges to
enforce the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights.141
133. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, ss 8–27.
134. Id. s 6 (“Wherever an enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent with the
rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be preferred to any
other meaning.”). But see id. s 4 (prohibiting courts from explicitly repealing or declining to
apply other statutes based on the grounds that they are inconsistent with the Bill of Rights Act,
notwithstanding a preference for giving a meaning consistent with the Act).
135. [2004] 3 NZLR 704 (HC) at [81].
136. Hopkinson, 3 NZLR 704 at [39].
137. Id. at [77].
138. Id. at [81].
139. Id.
140. For an account of the United Kingdom’s constitutional structure, see Political and
Constitutional Reform Comm., House of Commons, The UK Constitution: A Summary, with Options for Reform (2015).
141. Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42, §§ 1, 8(1) (Eng.).
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Much as in New Zealand, British judges lack the power to strike down statutes that conflict with protected rights.142 Judges can, however, creatively
reinterpret statutes so as to make them consistent with the Convention. Section 3 of the Human Rights Act provides: “So far as it is possible to do so . . .
legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with
the Convention rights.”143 As the parliamentary white paper introducing the
Human Rights Act made clear, this mandate requires that judges go much
further than simply resolving statutory ambiguities in favor of rights-protecting readings.144 A judge must strain to find a reading of a statute that will
not conflict with the Convention, even if that reading flatly contradicts the
statute’s plain text. This can mean reading words into the statute, reading
words out of the statute, or otherwise self-consciously modifying the statute’s meaning.145 British judges have thus used section 3 to essentially rewrite statutes in order to make them consistent with the European
Convention on Human Rights. One prominent example of such rewriting
through interpretation is Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza.146 In Ghaidan, the
House of Lords, then the United Kingdom’s highest court, invoked section 3
to interpret a statute providing tenant survivorship rights to “a person who
was living with the original tenant as his or her wife or husband” as also
providing such rights to unmarried homosexual partners.147 It did so because excluding homosexual couples from the tenancy provision would have
violated the Convention’s prohibition on discrimination.148 Gay marriage
142. Political and Constitutional Reform Comm., supra note 140, at 15.
143. Human Rights Act 1998 § 3(1).
144. Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill, 1997, Cm. 3782, ¶ 2.7 (“This
goes far beyond the present rule which enables the courts to take the Convention into account
in resolving any ambiguity in a legislative provision. The courts will be required to interpret
legislation so as to uphold the Convention rights unless the legislation itself is so clearly incompatible with the Convention that it is impossible to do so.”); see also JoAnne Sweeny,
Creating a More Dangerous Branch: How the United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act Has Empowered the Judiciary and Changed the Way the British Government Creates Law, 21 Mich. St. Int’l
L. Rev. 301, 322 (2013) (“All agree that Section 3 allows judges to be more creative when
interpreting a statute and even alter the statute’s wording if doing so would make the statute
compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights.”).
145. Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30, [32]–[33], [2004] 2 AC 557 (appeal
taken from Eng.), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldjudgmt/jd040621/
gha-1.htm [http://perma.cc/K4AP-9W4Y] (“[Section 3] is also apt to require a court to read in
words which change the meaning of the enacted legislation, so as to make it Conventioncompliant. In other words, the intention of Parliament in enacting section 3 was that, to an
extent bounded only by what is ‘possible’, a court can modify the meaning, and hence the
effect, of primary and secondary legislation.”). This aspect of the Act has been criticized as
giving judges too much power. See, e.g., James Allan, Statutory Bills of Rights: You Read Words
In, You Read Words Out, You Take Parliament’s Clear Intention and You Shake It All About—
Doin’ the Sankey Hanky Panky, in The Legal Protection of Human Rights: Sceptical
Essays 108 (Tom Campbell et al. eds., 2011).
146. Ghaidan, [2004] UKHL at [32]–[33].
147. Id. at [4], [35].
148. Id. at [24] (“In my view, therefore, Mr. Godin-Mendoza makes good the first step in
his argument: paragraph 2 of Schedule 1 to the Rent Act 1977, construed without reference to
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did not exist in the United Kingdom at the time Ghaidan was decided, so the
court was reinterpreting the words “wife or husband” to include people in
partnerships not legally recognized as marriages. In explaining this result,
Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead wrote:
It is now generally accepted that the application of section 3 does not depend upon the presence of ambiguity in the legislation being interpreted.
Even if, construed according to the ordinary principles of interpretation,
the meaning of the legislation admits of no doubt, section 3 may nonetheless require the legislation to be given a different meaning.149

The House of Lords thus explicitly recognized that by reinterpreting the
words “wife or husband,” it was effectively rewriting the statute to make it
consistent with the Convention.
Remedial reinterpretation is not limited to systems like those in the
United Kingdom and New Zealand, where weak-form judicial review is
combined with explicit statutory authorization to make creative interpretations.150 In Canada, for example, judges have the ability to reinterpret unconstitutional laws—which is labeled “reading down”—and this power is
judicially created and coexists with strong-form judicial review.151 In
Schachter v. Canada, the Canadian Supreme Court enumerated several different remedial strategies that can be employed when a statute is found to
violate the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Canada’s constitution.152 These include striking down the statute, extending the statute to add
applications that were unconstitutionally excluded, and reinterpreting the
statute so that it does not conflict with the Charter (reading it down).153 This
menu is the same as that available to American judges.154 And, while reading
down is not formally recognized as a remedy in Canada, it functions exactly

section 3 of the Human Rights Act, violates his Convention right under article 14 taken together with article 8.”).
149. Id. at [29].
150. Systems with “weak-form” judicial review do not allow judges to invalidate legislation, while systems with “strong-form” judicial review do. See generally Mark Tushnet,
Weak Courts, Strong Rights (2008).
151. See Schachter v. Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679, 719–20 (Can.); Stephen Gardbaum,
Are Strong Constitutional Courts Always a Good Thing for New Democracies?, 53 Colum. J.
Transnat’l L. 285, 309–10 (2015) (explaining that remedial measures like reading-down can
ease tension between constitutional courts and elected governments under strong-form judicial review).
152. [1992] 2 S.C.R. at 697–98, 719–20.
153. Schachter, [1992] 2 S.C.R. at 697–98, 719–20.
154. See supra Section II.B.
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like one.155 Judges in Canada may use reading down to choose interpretations that conflict with the legislature’s clear intentions,156 and Canadian
judges can only employ reading down after having found the most accurate
reading of the statute constitutionally invalid.157 Thus, Canada uses both
classical and rewriting avoidance in its remedial reinterpretation doctrine
(much like the United Kingdom and New Zealand do). Canadian courts also
adopt a separate constitutional avoidance canon that is distinct from reading
down, and is treated purely as a principle of statutory interpretation. This is
labeled the “Charter values” interpretive principle, and it is only applied in
cases where the statute is truly ambiguous, meaning the statute “is subject to
differing, but equally plausible, interpretations.”158 Canada’s system thus
does exactly what this Article advocates. It bifurcates constitutional avoidance into two different doctrines: (1) reading down, which treats avoidance
as a constitutional remedy, and (2) a Charter values canon, which treats
avoidance as a principle of statutory interpretation. The former is used to
effectively rewrite statutes to make them consistent with the Charter, while
the latter is used only to resolve statutory ambiguities.
These examples show that remedial reinterpretation has actually been
brought into practice in other countries. Judges around the world use a
combination of classic and rewriting avoidance to reinterpret statutes that
violate protected rights. And they do so according to the three-step process
advocated in this Article—first, the judge reads the statute according to conventional methods of interpretation; second, the judge decides that the standard interpretation violates a protected right; and third, the judge creatively
reinterprets the statute to preserve that right. In the United Kingdom and
New Zealand, remedial reinterpretation is the principal mechanism of judicial rights enforcement. In Canada, it exists alongside other forms of constitutional remedy and also coexists with a doctrinally distinct interpretive
155. See Danielle Pinard, A Plea for Conceptual Consistency in Constitutional Remedies, 18
Nat’l J. Const. L. 105, 108–11 (2006) (complaining that the Supreme Court of Canada’s
decisions create confusion about whether “reading down” is a remedy or a principle of statutory interpretation); Carol Rogerson, The Judicial Search for Appropriate Remedies Under the
Charter: The Examples of Overbreadth and Vagueness, in Charter Litigation 233, 248 (Robert J. Sharpe ed., 1987) (“While the courts continue to describe reading down as a technique of
interpretation rather than of invalidation, as a practical matter reading down is difficult to
distinguish from a remedy which would operate to declare particular applications of a law
unconstitutional. Reading down does require an initial determination by the court that particular applications of the statute would be unconstitutional.”).
156. E.g., R. v. Grant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 223 (Can.) (reading down a statutory provision that
allowed warrantless searches and doing so in a way that clearly conflicted with Parliament’s
intentions); Baron v. Canada, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 416, 454 (Can.) (“ ‘Reading down’ by amending
the clear intent of a statutory provision may be appropriate in some cases.”); Kent Roach,
Constitutional Remedies in Canada ¶ 14.480 (1994) (“Baron indicates a new willingness
to employ reading down as a remedial technique even in the face of what the court perceives as
clear legislative intent.”).
157. See Osborne v. Canada (Treasury Board), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 69 102–04 (Can.); Rogerson, supra note 155, at 248.
158. Bell ExpressVu Ltd. P’ship v. Rex, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, para. 62 (Can.); see also
Pinard, supra note 155, at 120–26.
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avoidance canon. These foreign models suggest that remedial reinterpretation might also be added to American judges’ menu of constitutional
remedies.
III. Remedial Reinterpretation in Practice
This final Part explores how bifurcating constitutional avoidance would
work in practice. First it shows how bifurcation solves several of the conceptual puzzles in modern avoidance doctrine, preventing judges from enforcing a penumbra of constitutional norms through statutory interpretation,
and creating more transparency in how the doctrine is applied. Next, it considers when judges should use remedial reinterpretation as opposed to other
constitutional remedies like invalidation, and it demonstrates the greater
flexibility that treating avoidance as a remedy brings. It then explores the
difficult question of just how far judges can stretch a statute’s meaning when
remedying a constitutional violation, proposing several limits that judges
might choose from. Finally, it closes by considering the reasons why judges
might want to blur the line between interpretation and remedy—for instance, in some cases, judges may wish to preserve rights by changing a law’s
meaning without having to make a constitutional holding.
A. The Doctrinal Benefits of Bifurcating Avoidance
By splitting constitutional avoidance into two different judicial tools—a
canon and a remedy—we can solve a number of contradictions in the current doctrine. Indeed, at a basic level, this bifurcation makes constitutional
avoidance coherent. If avoidance were only a principle of statutory interpretation, by which judges assumed that Congress does not intend to violate the
Constitution, then it would not logically be able to perform some of its
assigned functions. It could not, for instance, be used to change a statute’s
meaning by overriding Congress’s clear intentions.159 Further, it could not
be used to interpret a statute in light of a rule of constitutional law that had
not yet been announced by the Supreme Court—Congress could not have
been aware of any such rule when the law was passed.160 Bifurcating constitutional avoidance solves both of these problems.
After dividing up the doctrine, avoidance as an interpretive canon can
be restricted to cases where the statute is truly ambiguous, that is, cases
where both interpretations are fairly possible.161 It can thereby be used as a
rule of thumb to determine congressional intent, rather than a tool to subvert congressional intent. Interpretive avoidance can also be restricted so
that it applies only where the constitutional rule that the court invokes has
159. See supra notes 68–74 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
161. Judges of course may, and frequently do, disagree about whether or not certain interpretations are fairly possible. But bifurcation of the kind advocated here would reduce the
impulse to reach while interpreting a statute, because remedial reinterpretation is available as
an alternative.
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previously been established. This can be done by analogy to qualified immunity for government officers or deference under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act—two legal contexts where liability, when based on a
constitutional violation, must be clearly established under preexisting law.162
Remedial reinterpretation, in turn, can be used to enforce newly announced
rules of constitutional law and to change the statute’s meaning to something
Congress did not intend. But it can only be used to do these things if the
court makes an actual holding that the statute is unconstitutional as conventionally interpreted.
Bifurcating constitutional avoidance also prevents judges from changing
a statute’s meaning in cases where there is no actual violation of the Constitution. It thus avoids what Judge Posner has labeled the “judge-made constitutional ‘penumbra.’ ”163 Under the current doctrine, where avoidance’s
remedial and interpretive aspects are blended together, judges can creatively
reinterpret statutes merely in order to avoid constitutional “doubts” that
may ultimately be illusory.164 They can thus rewrite laws based on phantom
constitutional violations.
Splitting the doctrine into a remedy and a canon would eliminate the
judge-made constitutional penumbra. When avoidance is used as a remedy,
the judge has to first hold the statute unconstitutional before offering a reinterpretation. And when avoidance is used as an interpretive principle, the
judge cannot change the statute’s meaning but can only resolve a legitimate
ambiguity. Destroying the judge-made constitutional penumbra also eliminates a problem identified by Katyal and Schmidt—that the absence of a
constitutional holding could make judges more willing to go out on a limb
and announce new principles of constitutional law in avoidance cases.165 If a
judge must make a constitutional holding before creatively reinterpreting a
law, then the judge is held accountable for any novel constitutional theory
they employ; they must actually use the theory to hold the law unconstitutional. And a judge cannot use avoidance-as-interpretation to announce a
new theory, since they cannot assume that Congress was aware of the new
theory when it enacted the statute. Thus, if avoidance doctrine is bifurcated,
judges cannot use it as a low-consequence testing ground for novel constitutional theories.
Finally, bifurcation fixes one of the most serious problems with current
avoidance doctrine—that it is not transparent. Under the current approach
162. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of
a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted . . . unless
. . . adjudication of the [state court] claim . . . resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States . . . .”); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)
(“[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate ‘clearly established’ statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”).
163. Posner, supra note 73, at 816.
164. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
165. See Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 25, at 2114.
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to avoidance, judges do not distinguish cases where they are resolving a true
statutory ambiguity from cases where they are changing the statute’s meaning to preserve a constitutional principle. Scholars and judges acknowledge
that many cases fall into the latter category.166 But when deciding these cases,
judges generally pretend that the statute is ambiguous even if it is not.167
This means that the choice of which statutes get rewritten in the name of
avoidance and which do not is left to judges’ opaque discretion. Judges do
not have to articulate a principle that will distinguish the statutes they rewrite through interpretation from the statutes they strike down—they can
simply state that the former were ambiguous while the latter had a clear
meaning. For example, Richard Hasen has criticized the Supreme Court for
applying constitutional avoidance in NAMUDNO but not applying it in Citizens United, even though there were statutory interpretations available in
both those cases that would have avoided the constitutional issue.168 The
Court rejected the proffered avoidance reading in Citizens United, claiming it
lacked a “valid basis,”169 but in NAMUDNO the Court embraced a similarly
implausible reading of the relevant statute.170 The fact that the Court does
not distinguish between avoidance as a canon and avoidance as a remedy
permits such disparate results. When judges want to make a constitutional
holding, they can claim that the statute is clear, and when they do not want
to make a constitutional holding, they can claim that the statute is ambiguous. If rewriting avoidance were instead treated as a constitutional remedy,
then judges would have to more transparently distinguish the cases where
they change a statute’s meaning from the cases where they do not. If a court
adopted an admittedly inaccurate interpretation as a remedy in case one (for
example, NAMUDNO), but rejected remedial reinterpretation in case two
and instead struck down the statute (for example, Citizens United), it would
need to articulate a principle to explain the difference in results. Precedent,
and the need to distinguish cases, would make it more difficult for judges to
use avoidance selectively.
B When and How to Use Remedial Reinterpretation?
If avoidance is treated as a constitutional remedy, it will have to be
weighed against other constitutional remedies. The question thus arises:
How should a judge decide which remedy to impose? Consider again the
Supreme Court’s dilemma in United States v. Booker. The Court decided that
the Sentencing Reform Act was unconstitutional because it circumvented the
166. See supra notes 18–25, 73–79 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 65.
168. Hasen, supra note 14.
169. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 374 (2010) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring) (explaining why the majority did not adopt the avoidance interpretation).
170. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 206–11 (2009); see
sources cited supra note 14 (noting that the Court adopted a clearly incorrect interpretation of
the Voting Rights Act).

May 2016]

Constitutional Avoidance as Interpretation and as Remedy

1309

jury’s fact-finding function, thus violating the Sixth Amendment.171 But
there were two different ways to remedy this violation. On the one hand, the
Court could strike down part of the statute so as to make the sentencing
guidelines nonbinding.172 On the other, the Court could adopt an avoidance
reading that would take sentencing power from judges and give it to juries.173
How should the justices have chosen which of these remedies to impose?
I have argued elsewhere that in cases where a court has more than one
way to fix a constitutional violation, it should choose the remedy that best
serves the goals of the legislature that enacted the statute.174 In other words,
the court deciding on a remedy should try to figure out how the enacting
legislature would have wanted to solve the constitutional violation. This is
exactly what the Supreme Court did in Booker. Justices Stevens and Breyer
each argued that their preferred remedy best vindicated the purposes of the
Sentencing Reform Act, and that the alternative remedy instead undermined
those purposes.175 Thus, they each focused their analysis on the policy
choices of the Congress that passed the Sentencing Reform Act, and debated
the best way of preserving those choices. Ultimately, the majority determined that Justice Stevens’s avoidance remedy would take the statute further
from Congress’s intended purposes than would Justice Breyer’s partial
invalidation.
This is how constitutional avoidance will work if it is treated as a remedy. Judges will consider remedial reinterpretations alongside other possible
remedies, such as invalidating all or part of the statute’s text, invalidating an
application of the statute, or expanding the statute to fix unconstitutional
discrimination. They will then choose which of these remedies to apply in
the particular case. By contrast, if constitutional avoidance is treated only as
a matter of statutory interpretation, then any possible avoidance reading
must be rejected before the remedial options are considered. If the statute is
constitutional, after all, then there is nothing to remedy in the first place.
Treating avoidance as a remedy thus gives judges the flexibility to decide
whether they want to reinterpret the statute or fix the constitutional violation in some other way. In many cases, an avoidance remedy for an unconstitutional law will do less violence to the statutory scheme than would the

171. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
172. Id. at 258–65 (Breyer, J.).
173. Id. at 286 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
174. See Fish, supra note 28 (manuscript at 4).
175. Booker, 543 U.S. at 265 (2005) (Breyer, J.) (“In our view, it is more consistent with
Congress’ likely intent in enacting the Sentencing Reform Act (1) to preserve important elements of that system while severing and excising two provisions (§§ 3553(b)(1) and 3742(e))
than (2) to maintain all provisions of the Act and engraft today’s constitutional requirement
onto that statutory scheme.”); id. at 293 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (“Congress explicitly
rejected as a model for reform the various proposals for advisory guidelines that had been
introduced in past Congresses.”).
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alternatives.176 This explains the doctrine’s popularity with the current Supreme Court—constitutional avoidance allows the Court to tinker with a
statute rather than blowing it up. But an avoidance interpretation is not
always a minor change. In Booker, for example, Justice Stevens’s proposed
avoidance interpretation would have radically transformed federal sentencing law. It would have taken sentencing decisions out of judges’ hands and
placed them in the hands of juries and prosecutors. Treating avoidance as a
remedy allows judges to weigh the consequences of avoidance in cases like
Booker, and to opt for alternative remedies if they are more consistent with
the statute’s purpose.
Treating avoidance as a remedy also gives judges more flexibility in deciding how their reinterpretation of the statute will be implemented. For
example, if avoidance is a remedy, it can be made nonretroactive. The court
can declare that, while the statute previously meant X, it will instead mean Y
going forward.177 If avoidance were only an interpretive canon, however, this
would not be logically possible: the court would have to state that the statute
has always meant Y.178 It could not claim that the statute only started to
mean Y at the moment the court interpreted it. The same reasoning applies
to delay. A court that uses avoidance as a constitutional remedy can delay
that remedy to give the legislature time to amend the statute. In Northern
Pipeline v. Marathon Pipeline the Supreme Court struck down the existing
system of bankruptcy courts as unconstitutional, but delayed its remedy to
allow Congress to enact a replacement system.179 The Court could have done
the same thing if it imposed a reinterpretation remedy. But if a court uses
176. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593–94 (2012)
(opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (the Court opted to reinterpret a provision of the statute in a way
that caused no substantive changes, rather than striking the entire statute down); Nw. Austin
Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 205–06 (2009) (the Court adopted an
avoidance interpretation that allowed the plaintiff to bail out of the Voting Rights Act’s
preclearance provision, rather than striking down that preclearance provision altogether).
177. See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87–88
(1982) (making remedy nonretroactive). The Supreme Court’s remedy in Booker was made
nonretroactive. See Duncan v. United States, 552 F.3d 442, 443 (6th Cir. 2009); Lloyd v. United
States, 407 F.3d 608, 610 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 916 (2005); Guzman v. United States,
404 F.3d 139 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1035 (2005). If the Court had instead made its
remedy retroactive, then a huge number of federal prisoners would have been able to challenge
their sentences as illegal. This raises an interesting point about Justice Stevens’s proposed remedy. If the justices had held that the words “the court” in the Sentencing Reform Act were
intended to mean “the jury,” then all of the sentences imposed by judges under the federal
guidelines would have been unlawful under the Act. This would have created the exact problem that the Court avoided by making its remedy nonretroactive.
178. See Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993) (“When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of
federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and
as to all events, regardless of whether such events predate or postdate our announcement of
the rule.”).
179. N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 88; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 144 (1976) (delaying
partial invalidation of a statute by thirty days).
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avoidance as an interpretive canon, then it cannot logically delay the application of its decision. Such a court is simply stating what the statute already
means.
Finally, if avoidance is treated as a remedy, then it can be used in an asapplied fashion. A court can declare that a provision means X with respect
to one group of people, but, in order to fix a constitutional violation, it
means Y with respect to another group. Consider a recent pair of immigration decisions issued by the Supreme Court. In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Court
adopted an avoidance interpretation of a statute that provided for the administrative detention of certain aliens.180 Noting that indefinite detention
without trial would create due process problems, the Court interpreted the
statute so that aliens who had been previously admitted to the United States
could only be detained for a “reasonable” period of time.181 However, the
Court explicitly declined to extend this holding to aliens who had not yet
been admitted.182 Subsequently, in Clark v. Martinez, a non-admitted alien
argued that this atextual “reasonable time” limitation should apply to him as
well.183 The Court held that if the statute were interpreted that way for one
group of aliens, it must be interpreted that way for all.184 Justice Thomas
argued in dissent that the avoidance reading in Zadvydas should be limited
to admitted aliens since the statute only raised constitutional problems as
applied to them.185 Justice Scalia’s majority opinion derided Thomas’s approach, stating that it “would render every statute a chameleon, its meaning
subject to change depending on the presence or absence of constitutional
concerns in each individual case.”186 And this is true if one views constitutional avoidance only as a method of statutory interpretation. The statute
cannot logically be read to contain an implicit “reasonable time” limitation
for one group of aliens but not another. But if the avoidance reading were
instead a remedy that changed the statute’s meaning, then it could be used
in such an as-applied fashion. The Court could restrict its “reasonable time”
requirement to only those aliens for whom lengthy detention is
unconstitutional.187
180. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
181. Zadvydas, 553 U.S. at 682.
182. Id. (“We deal here with aliens who were admitted to the United States but subsequently ordered removed. Aliens who have not yet gained initial admission to this country
would present a very different question.”).
183. 543 U.S. 371 (2005).
184. Clark, 543 U.S. at 382.
185. Id. at 399 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I simply would read ambiguous statutes to avoid
as-applied constitutional doubts only if those doubts are present in the case before the
Court.”).
186. Id. at 382.
187. It is also worth noting that, if avoidance is treated as a remedy that actually changes a
statute’s meaning, then severability questions may arise. If a court reinterprets a statute so as
to exclude certain applications, other parts of the statute could theoretically be held inseverable from these applications. Elsewhere I have argued that such inseverability determinations
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C. The Limits of Interpretive Stretching
Remedial reinterpretation allows a court to change the meaning of an
unconstitutional statute by “interpreting” that statute against the legislature’s clear intentions. But how far can a court go in changing a statute’s
meaning? Put another way, at what point does creative interpretation stop
being interpretation? This is an odd question. It seeks a line between inaccurate readings of a statute that are permissible and inaccurate readings that
are impermissible. There are at least three places that such a line could be
drawn.
First, one might distinguish between interpretations that are incorrect
but plausible and those that are incorrect and implausible. This could be
done by analogy to the Chevron doctrine, which instructs courts to defer to
agency interpretations that are “permissible” readings of the statute.188 A
court that is imposing a reinterpretation remedy would thus be able to adopt
a reading of the statute that, while not the best reading according to conventional methods of interpretation, could still be reasonably believed by a good
faith interpreter. The Supreme Court’s avoidance interpretation in Sebelius
could be one example of such a “wrong but reasonable” reading.189 The provision at issue required the purchase of health insurance, stating that “[a]n
applicable individual shall . . . ensure that the individual, and any dependent
of the individual . . . is covered under minimum essential coverage.”190 The
majority in Sebelius determined that the best reading of this provision was as
a mandate, not a tax, due to its imperative language.191 But the statute also
required that the relevant penalty be paid through the covered individual’s
annual tax returns, and it calculated the penalty in part based on the individual’s taxable income.192 This evidence could make Chief Justice Roberts’s
interpretation of the provision as a tax fit within a Chevron-style zone of
reasonableness. The statute may not say “tax,” but it at least seems to operate like one. By way of contrast, the Court in NAMUDNO interpreted the
phrase “political subdivision” in a way that contradicted how that phrase
was explicitly defined in the statute.193 The Court’s avoidance interpretation
should be limited to only cases where the legislature has made one part of the statute conditional on another. See Eric S. Fish, Severability as Conditionality, 64 Emory L.J. 1293 (2015).
188. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984);
see also Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va. L. Rev. 187, 234 (2006) (“[I]t is hardly
unfamiliar for judges to think: ‘wrong, but reasonable.’ They might believe, for example, that a
jury’s verdict is incorrect but not clearly erroneous, or that some interpretations, even major
ones, are hard to defend but not ‘irrational.’ ”).
189. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); see also United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
190. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (2012).
191. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2600–01 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
192. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)–(c).
193. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 206–07 (2009); see 42
U.S.C. § 1973l(c)(2) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 10310(c)(2)); supra note 14 and accompanying
text.
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in NAMUDNO would thus likely not have qualified as wrong but
reasonable.
Second, one could use the general purposes of the statute to limit the
scope of creative reinterpretation. That is, one could draw the interpretive
line at readings of a statute that seriously undermine that statute’s goals. The
British House of Lords articulated just such a principle in Ghaidan v. GodinMendoza: “The meaning imported by application of section 3 must be compatible with the underlying thrust of the legislation being construed. Words
implied must . . . ‘go with the grain of the legislation.’ ”194 Thus the limiting
principle in the United Kingdom is that an interpretation must not conflict
with the legislation’s purpose. This means that British courts can stretch
statutory meanings quite far. In Ghaidan, for example, the House of Lords
interpreted the words “wife or husband” in a public housing law to include
people in same-sex partnerships not legally recognized as marriages.195 This
fit with the thrust of the statute, which was enacted to ensure that people’s
spouses could inherit their apartments.196 But the House of Lords’ creative
reinterpretation of the words “wife or husband” would not have worked, say,
for a law specifically designed to deny rights to gay couples. A gay-friendly
interpretation of those words would conflict with such a law’s purpose.
Third, one could draw the line at cases of direct contradiction. Under
this approach, a judge could use remedial reinterpretation to adopt any
reading of a statute so long as that reading is not explicitly foreclosed in the
statute’s text. A court could reinterpret the statute to carve out exceptions or
to expand the statute to cover new cases, but only so long as the statute’s
terms do not reject such interpretations. Consider once more the expansive
reading of “wife or husband” in Ghaidan. If the statute involved in that case
had contained a definitions section providing that “the terms ‘wife’ and
‘husband’ in this statute do not include people in homosexual partnerships,”
then the House of Lords’ interpretation would have been explicitly foreclosed. Similarly, if the provision at issue in Sebelius had stated “this mandate to purchase health insurance shall not be interpreted as a tax,” then
Chief Justice Roberts’s avoidance interpretation would not have been possible. If this were the rule, then a legislature that wanted to prevent a court
from adopting a particular remedial reinterpretation of a statute would have
to contemplate and specifically reject that interpretation when writing the
statute’s text. This creates a clear statement rule for the legislature. Prior to
1995, the Supreme Court of Israel employed such a clear statement rule in
its decisions enforcing Israel’s “Basic Law,” its statutory constitution.197 The
Israeli legislature could enact a law that contradicted the Basic Law only if it
194. Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30, [33], [2004] 2 AC 557 (appeal taken
from Eng.).
195. Id. at [4]–[24].
196. Id. at [4].
197. See CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Coop. Vill. 49(4) PD 1 (1995)
(Isr.). From 1995 onward, the Basic Law has been enforced through more overt judicial review.
Id. at 221.
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did so explicitly. As Chief Justice Aharon Barak wrote, “any ordinary legislation which contradicts the provisions of the Basic Law without stating explicitly that it is doing so will not be valid.”198 This created a very strong
clear statement rule. If the legislature did not specifically note that it was
contradicting the Basic Law, then any new legislation that it enacted would
be read narrowly so that it was made consistent with the Basic Law.199
D. Blurring the Line Between Canon and Remedy
If constitutional avoidance doctrine is split into an interpretive canon
and a remedy, then judges will formally no longer be able to change the
meanings of statutes without declaring them unconstitutional. The major
benefit of this approach is that it limits unaccountable judicial lawmaking.
Judges will no longer be able to essentially rewrite laws in the name of constitutional principles that may or may not have been violated. But there is
also a cost to this clarity. In situations where a court lacks the will to declare
a law unconstitutional, possibly because doing so will result in a political
backlash, it will have less ability to protect imperiled rights. Philip Frickey
has written about a number of avoidance decisions during the Warren
Court, in which the Court creatively reinterpreted laws persecuting political
dissidents. Frickey notes that “[b]y generally deciding these cases at the subconstitutional level through the rules of avoidance, the Court used techniques that might defuse political opposition while incrementally adjusting
public law to better respect individual liberty.”200 There may be situations
where it is better for judges to be able to protect rights by changing a statute
without making a constitutional holding. Judges can thereby put the burden
back on the legislature to reenact the rights-infringing aspects of the law if it
truly wants them, and judges can do so without risking the political backlash
that might result from holding a law unconstitutional.201
Bifurcating the avoidance canon takes away this option, at least formally. But of course judges can still claim to be interpreting a statute when
they are in fact changing its meaning. The line between a true interpretive
ambiguity and a false one is often unclear in practice, and judges can read
ambiguity into unambiguous statutes. Judges do sometimes have a strategic
incentive to blur the line between interpretation and lawmaking. By claiming
198. Aharon Barak, A Constitutional Revolution: Israel’s Basic Laws, 4 Const. F. 83, 83
(1993).
199. See Rivka Weill, Reconciling Parliamentary Sovereignty and Judicial Review: On the
Theoretical and Historical Origins of the Israeli Legislative Override Power, 39 Hastings Const.
L.Q. 457, 462 (2012) (“[T]his mechanism has deep roots in parliamentary sovereignty systems
and is a natural development of common-law interpretation techniques, under which there is
a presumption against implied repeal of fundamental rights. This presumption is overcome if
the legislature uses explicit override language.”).
200. Frickey, supra note 62, at 401.
201. See, e.g., Re, supra note 14 (observing that the Supreme Court sometimes uses avoidance decisions to signal its intent to make a constitutional holding in the near future and to
give the political branches the chance to prevent such a holding through new legislation or
policies).
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to merely interpret a statute, they can diffuse political opposition in cases
where such opposition would rise up against a constitutional holding.202
Such fudging may even sometimes serve important system values. Intellectual precision and logical clarity are important, even crucial, to the enterprise of judging, but they are not the only values that matter.203 It might, in
at least some extreme cases, be desirable for judges to effectively rewrite laws
while pretending to exercise restraint.204
Conclusion
Constitutional avoidance is a legal lichen. It appears to be one organism,
but it is really two. The ambition of this Article has been to reveal constitutional avoidance’s dual nature. While it is formally understood as only a
principle of interpretation, it should also be understood—and in some cases
has actually been used—as a constitutional remedy. This new way of framing constitutional avoidance helps to make theoretical sense of the Supreme
Court’s aggressive use of the doctrine. It also brings logical coherence to
constitutional avoidance, and clarifies the nature of courts’ power to effectively change the meanings of laws by “interpreting” them.

202. See id. at 181; cf. Shai Dothan, Reputation and Judicial Tactics: A Theory of
National and International Courts 46–47 (2015) (discussing various strategies for improving courts’ reputations and thereby their legitimacy, including considerations of political
pushback).
203. See, e.g., Robert Post, Democracy, Popular Sovereignty, and Judicial Review, 86 Calif.
L. Rev. 429, 442 (1998) (“When the Court chooses to press a particular vision of the national
ethos in the face of opposition, it is rendered vulnerable to political reprisal, which can take
such various forms as civil disobedience, hostile Presidential appointments, or constitutional
amendments. The difficulty and necessity of navigating through such dangers is why it is said
that Justices of the Supreme Court must be ‘statesmen.’ ”).
204. Cf. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 183
(1980) (“That’s an old debate the abolitionists had: should a judge distort the (pre-Civil War)
Constitution by pretending it doesn’t support slavery, or resign from the bench and fight his
battles elsewhere?”).

